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ABSTRACT 
The first of three papers corrects two flaws in the 
literature on traffic misallocation under rate regulation by 
the ICC. First, it is shown that, contrary to suggestions 
in several recent studies, the comparative-cost approach, 
which determines an efficient allocation by assigning all 
traffic in a class to the low-cost mode, does not necessarily 
overstate the welfare loss on misallocated traffic. Second, 
Levin's modal-split procedure was applied to data for 1963-64. 
Although the modal-split concept, in which an efficient traffic 
~~--~~~~El.--i-&t=-r-i-b-u-1;-iGn-i-s-de-J;-i-v:ed~f-:r;:om-the----demand-f-unc.tion-,___has-he ........... __ ~--~­
app lied several times, the different procedures make compari-
sons over time difficult. Comparing Levin's results for 1972 
with those obtained here indicates that the extent and the 
cost of the traffic misallocation have declined. 
The second paper attempts to determine the pricing and 
welfare effects of competition and regulation in a transpor-
tation network. The pricing and input (car assignment) 
decisions of a railroad monopolist subject to common carrier 
and round-trip constraints are determined. Then competition 
is introduced by shifts in rail demand and regulation as a 
set of constraints on pricing that are based on costs observed 
in the network. Both competition and regulation can cause 
iv 
peak (fully-loaded) directions to change, and the welfare 
effects can be negative. 
The final paper examines the effect of jurisdictional 
cost separations in telecommunications on input use by the 
profit-maximizing firm. In an Averch-Johnson formulation 
of the problem, separations can alter some of the expected 
factor use relationships. In addition, the firm has an 
incentive to employ unproductive inputs in a jurisdiction 
that has no productive input specifically assigned to it. 
But because the Averch-Johnson model is an unrealistic 
characterization of the regulatory process, a model is 
developed in which the regulator explicitly sets prices on 
the basis of the firm's profitability in a previous period 
Since the firm can influence future 
prices by its input choices in the present period, it may 
choose to hire unproductive inputs. Moreover, the cost 
separations process distorts factor use relative to a 
multi-product firm regulated on the basis of overall 
profitability. 
v 
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THE EFFECT OF RATE REGULATION ON FREIGHT TRAFFIC ALLOCATION 
The Interstate Commerce Commission has long been 
~riticized for maintaining a rate structure for freight 
transportation that causes a misallocation of traffic among 
modes and thereby contributes to the financial difficulties 
of the railroads. The misallocation is said to arise 
because rates do not coincide with the costs of providing 
service. The extent of the misallocation has usually been 
measured by reassigning traffic to the lower-cost carrier 
· ··in shipment classes· def·Ined·by comrrioaiEy;--weigh t, and.length.... .... ... .... ~··· 
of haul, a procedure known as the comparative-cost method. 
Using this approach, Harbeson found the cost of the mis-
allocation between railroads and trucks in the early 1960s 
to be as much as $2.9 billion per year, a figure which has 
become important evidence in the case against regulation. 1 
More recent work, however, indicates that the size of 
the misallocation has been overstated. In particular, Levin 
has shown that the cost of this inefficiency is more likely 
1Robert Harbeson, "Toward Better Resource Allocation 
in Transport," Journal of Law and Economics 12 (October 
1969): 332. 
2 
on the order of $100 million per year. 2 These studies have 
proceeded by estimating market shares for each mode on the 
basis of relative rates and service characteristics and then 
using the regression coefficients to determine a cost-based 
allocation of traffic. This technique has been labelled the 
modal-split method. 
The modal-split approach embodies a more realistic view 
of modal choice by shippers and so measures more accurately 
the cost of the traffic misallocation. This paper, however, 
corrects two important errors in previous research. First, 
Levin asserted that the comparative-cost method necessarily 
overstates the extent of the misallocation, even if the 
average service differential between railroads and trucks in 
comparison of the two methods demonstrates that Levin's 
statement is not true. Second, it is difficult to compare 
the results of the two approaches because data from two 
different time periods have been used. That is, comparative-
cost results are generally based on statistics from the 
early 1960s, while modal-split studies have relied on data 
from the early 1970s. This paper indicates the relative 
importance of different procedures and time periods by 
2Richard Levin, "Allocation in Surface Freight Trans-
portation: Does Rate Regulation Matter?" Bell Journal of 
Economics 9 (Spring 1978): 38. 
3 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
3 
reporting the results of an earlier update of the 
comparative-cost method 4 and by applying the modal-split 
procedures to the 1960s data. 
The organization of this paper is straightforward. 
Section 1 examines the roots of the traffic misallocation. 
Section 2 reviews previous studies and compares the 
comparative-cost and modal-split approaches. Section 3 
uses the modal-split method to estimate the cost of the 
misallocation in the early 1960s. Finally, section 4 
considers the policy implications of this research. 
4Lee Sparling, "Rate Regulation and Freight Traffic 
Allocation: A Review and Revision," Social Science Working 




1. ICC rate regulation and the efficient allocation of 
traffic 
Regulated freight rates are based on both cost and 
demand conditions. The proportions by which rates exceed 
costs are greater for high-value manufactured goods than 
for low-value bulk commodities, a rate structure known as 
value-of-service pricing. The purpose of this section is 
to describe the role of the ICC in maintaining this rate 
structure and to explain how the Commission's rate policies 
have produced a misallocation of traffic among modes. 
The Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 prohibited railroad 
price discrimination among shippers but failed to address 
either discrimination by commodities or the basic problem of 
monopoly power. The railroads supported regulation because 
. : .. : :i.t. st:abT1.:.fzea.tl:1e.:.·rate 1eve-i-whi1e=--1eaving- va-lue:...of-ser:v-ice::..-
. . . t t 5 pr1c1ng in ac • Value-of-service pricing survived because 
it maximized railroad prof its while serving the interest of 
the government in the development of the West. 
Rail transportation demands in 1887 were more elastic 
5The period before 1887 was marked by the formation and 
collapse of several railroad traffic pools. MacAvoy has 
documented the effectiveness of regulation in eliminating 
the sharp rate fluctuations that characterized this cycle, 
and Kolko has shown that the railroads recognized the 
potential and actual value of regulation in stabilizing the 
cartel. Paul MacAvoy, The Economic Effects of Regulation: 
The Trunk Line Railroad Cartels and the Interstate Commerce 
Commission before 1900 (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology Press, 1965) and Gabriel Kolko, Railroads and 
Regulation, 1877-1916 (New York: w. W. Norton, 1965). 
5 
for bulk commodities than for manufactured goods for two 
reasons. First, barge competition was generally more 
effective for bulk agricultural and mineral goods, and 
second, the shares of freight costs in delivered prices were 
higher for bulk commodities. As a result, low rates on bulk 
goods and high rates on manufactured products were more 
profitable than relatively uniform rates. 6 At the same time 
this rate structure promoted Western development. Low rates 
on bulk exports increased the settlers' market area, while 
high rates on manufactured imports speeded the growth of 
Western industry. 
However, railroad pressure for modification of the rate 
structure arose as growing intermodal competition produced 
more elastic demands for rail transportation. In addition, 
~ -- -~ -
~-- - ---
an imbalance in cross-country movements c~ai.isecf-a -shortage -or 
capacity for agricultural shipments that exerted upward 
pressure on bulk rates. But the ICC and Congress continued 
to hold bulk rates down and reaffirm value-of-service 
pricing in order to protect depressed agricultural areas. 
6The profit-maximizing condition that marginal revenue 
equal marginal cost can be written: 
1 p(l--) =me 
n or 
p-mc = 1 
me n-1 
where p = price, me = marginal cost, and n = elasticity of 
demand for any market. That is, the prof it-maximizing 
markup varies inversely with the elasticity of demand. 
6 
This policy enabled motor carriers to divert lucrative 
merchandise traffic from the railroads. Motor carriers were 
able to undercut regulated railroad rates even though their 
costs were probably higher than the railroads' on all but 
the shortest hauls. Faced with both chaotic economic 
conditions in the trucking industry (due primarily to excess 
capacity) and the railroads' loss of revenue, Congress 
regulated motor carriers in 1935 but did exempt agricultural 
commodities from rate regulation. Trucking rates became 
based on rail rates, as much a matter of expediency as 
anything else. Barge transportation came under limited 
regulation in 1940 despite the fact that water carriers 
forced the railroads to maintain low rates on competitive 
bulk traffic. But competition by the lower-cost barges 
could have caused the railroads to reduce service on 
competitive routes or forced the ICC to allow compensating 
rail bulk rate increases wherever barge competition was not 
effective. It appears, therefore, that the Commission has 
been able to maintain low rates on agricultural and resource 
goods only by regulating both the trucks that directly 
threatened the profitable rail traffic in industrial 
products and the barges that indirectly jeopardized low 
rail rates on non-competitive bulk shipments. 7 
7
This sequence of events is a good example of McKie's 
"tar-baby effect," the "extension of control in response to 
perpetually escaping effects of earlier regulation." James 
7 
Motor carriers have continued to attract traffic from 
the railroads because they have provided faster and more 
reliable service. As a result, the railroad share of inter-
city ton-miles declined from 62.4 percent in 1939 to 36.3 
percent in 1976 while the corresponding motor carrier share 
increased from 9.7 percent to 23.5 percent. 8 
The railroads have been unable to use their cost 
advantage to recapture traffic lost to motor carriers or to 
compete effectively for new shipments of manufactured goods 
because the ICC has required rate parity for the two modes. 
Although the Commission has occasionally approved a lower 
rail rate to account for inferior service, its general 
policy has been to allow no rail rate reduction below the 
aver a level which usual 
exceeds long-run marginal cost for the railroads. The ICC's 
concern has apparently been to maintain fair shares of 
traffic by allowing regulated carriers an equal opportunity 
McKie, "Regulation and the Free Market: The Problem of 
Boundaries," Bell Journal of Economics and Management 
Science 1 (Spring 1970): 9, 14-17. This is not to say that 
the other modes were unwilling participants in the process: 
Nelson has shown that large trucking firms supported the 
application of entry and rate controls to their industry. 
James Nelson, "The Motor Carrier Act of 1935," Journal of 
Political Economy 44 (August 1936): 464-504. 
8The 1939 shares are reported in, Ann Friedlaender, 
The Dilemma of Freight Transport Regulation (Washington: The 
Brookings Institution, 1969), p. 204, and the 1976 shares 
are given in, Interstate Commerce Commission, 9lst Annual 
Report (1977). 
8 
to compete for merchandise shipments and to prevent rate 
wars that would have undermined value-of-service pricing. 9 
Consistent with its support of value-of-service pricing, the 
Commission has been more willing to let the railroads compete 
with barges for the transportation of bulk commodities. 10 
Most of the Lecent studies of the Commission's rate 
policies have relied on relatively old figures on rail costs 
and revenues to demonstrate the existence of value-of-
service pricing. These figures indicate that the ratio of 
revenue to variable cost for shipments in 1961 was 1.06 for 
mine products, 1.18 for farm commodities, and 1.48 for 
manufactured goods. 11 
However, some skepticism about the extent of value-of-
-·- -·-- --·--- - ~-The-rec ~-however-, _J:ias _ge nerai-ly __ a1-i-o::w:e-:-d_ ths: rai.-:--i-rc:>:c;~9.J:L .......... _______ _ 
to reduce rates as low as marginal cost to compete with 
unregulated carriers. Detailed reviews of the Commission's 
decisions in intermodal rate cases are given in, Ernest 
Williams, The Regulation of Rail-Motor Rate Competition 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958) and George Hilton, 
The Transportation Act of 1958: A Decade of Experience 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969). 
1°Friedlaender's book offers a more complete discussion 
of the development of regulation and the apparent motivation 
for ICC policy decisions. Friedlaender, pp. 7-27. 
11 . . f Interstate Commerce Comm1ss1on, Bureau o Accounts, 
Distribution of the Rail Revenue Contribution by Commodity 
Groups, 1966, (June 1964), reported in, Friedlaender, p. 56. 
I am not aware that a more recent set of figures for all 
commodities is available. Most of the traffic misallocation 
studies focus on manufactured goods and so report revenues 
and costs for that class. Levin, for example, found that 
the ratio of revenue to variable costs for shipments in 1972 
was 1.4 for his sample of manufactured products. Levin, 
pp. 39-40. 
9 
service pricing has been expressed. Levin has argued that 
the ICC is now more likely to use a carrier's own variable 
costs to determine minimum rates. 12 In addition, Boyer has 
suggested that the markups used to demonstrate value-of-
service pricing are misleading because the underlying cost 
estimates are unreliable. For example, coal moved in 1961 
at rates that covered only 86 percent of the fully allocated 
costs calculated by the ICC, but the Chesapeake and Ohio and 
the Norfolk and Western railroads were quite profitable even 
with high concentrations of bituminous coa1. 13 Unit-train 
service was not available until 1963, 14 but the railroads 
probably experienced lower costs on coal traffic than on 
other carload shipments in 1961 because coal moved in larger 
~~~-~~~~an_d~mQ~C~~regular volmnes. The cos-t:-finding procedures used 
I 
by the ICC did not account for this difference, so the actual 
ratio of revenue to cost for railroad coal movements almost 
12Ibid., pp. 40-41. 
13Kenneth Boyer, "The Price Sensitivity of Shippers' 
Mode of Transport Selection and the Intermodal Allocation 
of Freight Traffic" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Michigan, 1975), p. 15. Boyer cited Friedlaender's 
discussion of the coal example. Friedlaender, pp. 24-25. 
ICC cost-finding procedures are described in more detail in 
section 3 below. 
14MacAvoy and Sloss have shown that the introduction of 
unit-train service was delayed by the Commission's decision 
that locational discrimination allowed under single carload 
rates would not be permitted under unit-train rates. Paul 
MacAvoy and James Sloss, Regulation of Transport Innovation: 
The ICC and Unit Coal Trains to the East Coast (New York: 
Random House, 1967). 
10 
surely exceeded .86. 
This suggests that the ICC has been more concerned 
about relative rates than about relative markups. That is, 
while the markup on coal has probably increased because of 
increases in volume and improvements in service that reduced 
costs, the Commission has been able to satisfy mining and 
farming interests by maintaining the historical relationship 
among rates, a relationship more visible to shippers than 
relative markups. If markups were the more important concern 
for shippers and the Commission, then more accurate cost-
finding procedures would have been developed. 
The basis of all the comparative-cost and modal-split 
studies, including those of Levin and Boyer, is that a mis-
allocation of traffic exists because rates differ from the 
-·· - -·----------- -----·----···- - ----·--·- -
long-run marginal costs of providing.service and that the 
extent of the misallocation can be determined by reassigning 
traffic to the lower-cost carrier. But if a monopoly rail-
road were unable to cover total costs by pricing at marginal 
cost and lump-sum transfers were not feasible, then second-
best pricing rules require that demand conditions be 
considered. That is, optimal prices include markups high 
enough to enable the firm to break even and inversely 
related to the elasticities of demand in each market. 
Braeutigam has extended the usual welfare analysis to 
intermodal competition in transportation and found that the 
optimal rate structure for the railroads resembles value-
11 
f 
. . . 15 o -service pricing. In addition, a model of railroad 
pricing that focuses on operation in a network indicates 
that welfare- or prof it-maximization requires the adoption 
of peak-load pricing principles. 16 Consequently, the 
comparative-cost and modal-split studies address the 
misallocation of traffic only in a limited sense: they 
estimate the cost savings associated with pricing at 
marginal cost and ignore breakeven problems and network 
effects. 
The misallocation studies also assume that it is ICC 
rate policy that prevents carriers from pricing at marginal 
cost. That assumption, however, is suspect for at least two 
reasons. First, many shippers are served by only one rail-
road, and intermodal competition is not always an effective 
deterrent to the t power. 
example, are not a practical alternative to the railroads 
on long hauls because of their relatively high line-haul 
costs. Second, Boyer has argued that existing rate bureau 
procedures are as much a source of rigidity in the rate 
h C • • I l' • 17 h' • • structure as t e ommission s po icies. T is view is 
substantiated to some extent by the apparent failure of the 
15 
Ronald Braeutigam, "Optimal Pricing with Intermodal 
Competition," American Economic Review 69 (March 1979): 38-49. 
16This model is developed in chapter II below. 
17Boyer, p. 19. 
12 
railroads to adjust relative prices under the rate provisions 
of the 4R Act. 18 As a result, the misallocation studies 
overstate the likely cost saving on current traffic of 
increased rate freedom for the railroads. 19 
18The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act 
of 1976 established variable cost as the minimum rate 
standard and authorized the railroads to increase any rate 
below variable cost up to that level. The legislation also 
allowed the railroads to raise or lower rates 7% per year 
without suspension by the ICC, subject to the minimum rate 
rule and the absence of "market dominance" by the carrier. 
The Commission's interpretation of the market dominance 
provision has been criticized on the grounds that it unduly 
limits the railroads' rate flexibility and thereby violates 
the intent of Congress. 
19 rt is not unlikely that the antitrust exemption for 
rate buriaus will survive the current campaign for regulatory 
reform because there is strong carrier support for rate 
bureaus and a clear need for railroads to arrange joint 
routes and rates. 
'- «J - - ' 
13 
2. The comparative-cost and modal-split procedures in 
practice and theory 
The cost penalty associated with carriage by a higher-
cost mode is known as an intermodal loss. The purposes of 
this section are, first, to review several studies of the 
intermodal loss that arises in rail and truck transportation 
of manufactured goods because rates differ from the costs of 
providing service and, second, to compare the underlying 
comparative-cost and modal-split approaches. 
Three studies have used a comparative-cost procedure, 
in which an efficient allocation of traffic is determined 
by assigning all shipments in a particular class to the 
lower-cost mode. In the earliest and most comprehensive 
work, Meyer and his associates examined transportation costs, 
~----~----- :market-=structure-s-i-=a11a=aemand condit-i-oI1s ---in•-determining.•-- both------- - -
an efficient modal distribution of freight traffic and a 
1 1 . d · h t · 
20 regu atory po icy con ucive to sue an op imum. In the 
process, motor carrier costs were computed from ICC formulas, 
and rail costs were estimated from regress~ons of expense 
categories on output and size variables. 21 In addition, the 
20 John Meyer et al., The Economics of Competition in 
the Transportation Industries (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1959). 
21This paper focuses more on traffic allocation methods 
than on costing techniques. ICC cost-finding procedures 
have been severely criticized, but there is no clear bias in 
the resulting estimates of intermodal loss. In addition, 
the studies reviewed here indicate that the intermodal loss 
estimates are more sensitive to choice of traffic allocation 
method than to choice of costing procedure. 
14 
rail costs were increased to account for the inventory costs 
of the longer transit time and larger minimum load required 
for rail shipments. For the rail and motor carriage of 
high-value manufactured goods, Meyer found that the railroads 
had "a narrow cost advantage at 100 miles and a clear and 
increasing cost advantage for traffic moving over 200 miles," 
while 97 percent of large· common carrier truck operations 
covered more than 100 miles. 22 
In an attempt to determine the social cost of the 
misallocation identified by Meyer, Harbeson computed costs 
for both modes from ICC regional cost figures and adjusted 
them for inventory costs and a deficiency in highway user 
23 charges. Specifically, the costs of average loads (16.6 
tons for trucks and 33.7 tons for railroads were 
to determine the low-cost mode at various d stances. 
census figures on traffic distribution, the total of the 
losses from carriage of manufactured goods by the high-cost 
mode at each distance was found to lie between $1.1 billion 
and $2.9 billion per year, depending on the regional cost 
24 scales employed. 
Harbeson's results are difficult to interpret because 
the cost comparisons are based on different shipment sizes 
22Ibid., p. 194. 
23 Harbeson, pp. 321-338. 
24 Ibid., p. 332. 
.... " .:.· 
15 
for the two modes. His approach assumes that the relevant 
choices for the shipper are a truck shipment of a certain 
size or a rail shipment of approximately twice that size. 
Certainly the use of the average weights for all shippers 
demands justification; but more important is the fact that 
the analysis requires a change in the scheduling and 
operations of the shipper. Without a more sophisticated 
model of inventory costs and shipper decisions, it seems 
more appropriate to shift traffic to the low-cost mode 
without altering other shipment characteristics. This is 
the procedure adopted in the Friedlaender book. 25 
In her review of the failures of freight transport 
regulation and the probable effects of alternative policies, 
Fried~aender~calculated costs for several shipment sizes and 
determined for each size the distance beyond which the rail-
roads, with higher terminal and lower line-haul costs, were 
the more efficient carrier. Again, ICC costs 26 were 
modified by rail inventory charges and increased motor 
25Friedlaender, pp. 36-43. 
26 . dl d . 1 . d . Frie aen er serious y overestimate motor carrier 
line-haul costs. In effect, she double-counted by computing 
those line-haul costs from ICC reported figures for both 
line-haul costs per vehicle-mile and per hundredweight-mile; 
but these are regional averages calculated as the quotients 
of total variable line-haul costs and, first, vehicle-miles 
and, second, hundredweight-miles. The error is implicit in 
the cost calculations. Ibid., p. 39. The correct interpre-
tation of the cost figures is given in, Interstate Commerce 
Commiss,ion, Bureau of Accounts, Simplified Procedures for 
Determining Cost of Handling Freight by Motor Carriers (1968), 
p. 4. 
16 
carrier user fees. A comparison of the estimated distances 
with modal distribution figures by size of shipment and 
length of haul revealed a misallocation in favor of motor 
carriers for shipments weighing less than 40 tons and moving 
more than 200 miles. 27 
What these three studies have in common is that the 
efficient distribution of traffic was determined by assigning 
shipments to the low-cost mode in each traffic category. 
Meyer's two traffic classes consist of shipments moving more 
or less than 200 miles. Harbeson's categories are defined 
by average loads moving distances corresponding to the 
mileage blocks used in available census figures. Finally, 
Friedlaender's classes are determined by specific shipment 
sizes and the estimated mileages above which railroads are 
more efficient than trucks. 
Critics of the comparative-cost approach have argued 
that since shippers have different transportation require-
ments some will choose a different mode than the average or 
representative shipper in a traffic category. Shippers 
differ in access to the modes and in preferences with respect 
to such modal characteristics as speed and reliability of 
service. The modal-split approach addresses the problem by 
using demand functions to determine the distribution of 
traffic that arises when rates equal the long-run marginal 
27Friedlaender, p. 68. 
17 
costs of providing service. Moreover, since the demand 
functions embody shipper judgments about the service attri-
butes of the modes, they can be used to evaluate the welfare 
gains associated with rate changes. 
Figure 1 shows the standard welfare triangle for rail 
transportation of a particular class of traffic. The modal-
split approach assumes first that rates equal marginal (and 
average) costs for motor carriers, a condition about which 
h . b k . 1 28 t ere is reason to e s eptica • That assumption leads 
to an overstatement of the traffic misallocation and its 
cost: if regulation raises truck rates above costs, then 
the allocation away from railroads because of rail pricing 
distortions is reduced. 
The downward sloping demand curve for rail service in 
figure 1 reflects both the shift of traffic from motor 
carriers and the generation of new shipments as the rail 
rate falls. For a shipment switched to the railroads in 
response to a slight decline in the rail rate, it must be 
the case that the cost to the shipper of using trucks is 
just below the corresponding cost of using railroads at the 
28 h . . d h . . d T ere is evi ence t at entry restrictions an rate 
bureau activities have enabled motor carriers to maintain 
rates above a competitive level. The high value of the 
certificates required for common carrier operation indicates 
that the present value of economic prof its is substantial. 
In addition, motor carrier rates fell 20 percent (and service 
improved) when various commodities were deregulated for a 
short time in the 1950s. 
rai 
rat 




= resource savings of 
rate at rail cost for 
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truck service at R 
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from rate at rail 
cost for shipper 
entering market at R 
demand curve for rail 
transportation, given 
truck rate at cost 
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Figure 1 
original rail rate. But the private. cost of shipping by 
railroad exceeds the social cost by the difference between 
the rail rate and rail cost; so that difference measures, 
resource savings of the shift to rail carriage. Similarly, 
the consumers' surplus associated with new traffic can be 
measured by the excess of the rate that stimulated the 
shipment over rail cost. Taken together, the shifted and 
new traffic generate cost savings and consumers' surplus as 
the regulated rate falls to rail cost that can be measured 
by the area of the triangle ABc. 29 
29
A more complete discussion of the argument is given in 
Theodore Keeler, "On the Economic Impact of Railroad Freight 
Regulation," Department of Economics Working Paper No. SL-
7601, University of California - Berkeley, September 7, 1976, 
pp. 27-30. 
19 
Assuming that the demand and cost functions in figure 1 
are 1 . 3 0 h f h lf . 1 c . inear, t e area o t ewe are tr1ang e AB is: 
where 6p. = difference between the regulated rate 1 (Pi) and rail marginal cost for traffic 
class i 
6q. = difference between the competitive and 1 actual ( q. ) rail outputs for class i. 1 
With some manipulation of equation 1, the welfare loss for 




= ~ l: z· o· 2 n-i 1 J. 1 





·· ·· -- -·- --. - ~- ... - ...... __ ...... z i· = . .. . -R·-- ... ····- s·h-a-r~e~of---ra·i-1~r-eve-n1:1-e~a-ee·otm-t-ecl--·· ------------------------------------= 
··for by t:r-aT:fic- <::Tass ·T· 
oi = 
6pi 
= ratio of the difference between 
Pi the regulated rate and rail 
marginal cost to the regulated 
rate for class i 
P· 6q. 1 1 
elasticity of demand for rail ni = = q. 6p. transportation for class i. 31 1 1 
Friedlaender apparently had some reservations about the 
30Rail marginal cost, however, need not be constant, as 
shown. 
31 Friedlaender, p. 71. Equation 2 is often used to 
evaluate welfare losses. See, for example, F. M. Scherer, 
Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 
(Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1970), pp. 401-402. 
20 
comparative-cost approach because she also used equation 2 
to estimate the welfare loss. She erred, however, by adding 
the areas of the welfare triangles for both truck and rail 
demand curves. The rail component of her calculation 
indicates by itself that the cost of traffic misallocated 
or not handled at all because of rate regulation was about 
$150 million for manufactured goods and $170 million for 
all commodities in 1964. 32 
While Friedlaender used ICC figures on the ratio of 
revenue to cost for each commodity class, Keeler used his 
own estimates of rail long-run marginal cost to update the 
welfare calculation. He found that the welfare loss in 1969 
was no more than $180 million for manufactured goods and 
~~~~~~~~ ~~-->===..;::~=---..=:;;..:;;...:;:.....,,,_;:;;._::;~.products. 3 3 
Levin, however, calculated the welfare loss directly 
from equation 1 by estimating a modal choice model and 
32Friedlaender, pp. 72-74. 
33The figures reported by Keeler are not correct. 
Friedlaender used an overall ratio of price to marginal 
cost of 1.27; Keeler updated the figure to 1.42 and scaled 
up each Oi (the ratio of the difference between price and 
marginal cost to price for traffic class i) by a factor of 




-p-= .21, R_ = 1.42 => me 
p-me 
-- = .30, 
p 
and therefore each Oi should be scaled up by a factor of 
1.42 (= .30/.21). This yields annual losses of $180 million 
for manufactured goods and $400 million for all commodities, 
not the corresponding $200 and $500 million shown by Keeler. 
Keeler, p. 32. 
-· ·-· ........ .: ..... ··- ····· ... ~ -~-··~ - '·-. ·--··-···~·--.. ~ ... 
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using it to determine the rail shares and outputs corre-
spending to both actual rates and long-run marginal costs. 
Levin specified a logit model, in which the probability 
of a shipper choosing a given mode is a function of differ-
ences in prices and service quality among competing mod"es. 
The model is consistent with utility-maximization in problems 
of discrete choice (in general, a shipper selects only one 
mode to carry a particular class of traffic), and, unlike a 
linear probability or share model, it constrains market 
shares to the zero-one interval. The regression model can be 
written: 
3 
where f · 1 = market share for mode i, i = 1,2, ••• ,n-1 
Ri = rate charged by mode i 
v = commodity value 
Ti = mean transit time for mode i 
CTi = standard deviation of transit time for mode i 
Ei = disturbance for equation i. 
Levin considered three modes: truck, railroad, and piggyback 
(trailer-on-flat-car service). Because of the symmetry of 
the logit function, the regression model reduces to two 
equations; in addition, the requirement that market shares 
sum to one constrains the coefficient on each independent 
variable to be the same in both equations. The constant in 
each equation can be interpreted as a measure of the service 
22 
difference between modes that ~s not captured by the speed 
and reliability variables. The model was estimated with 
observations in markets defined by commodity, shipment size, 
34 and length of haul. 
The regression results were then used to predict market 
shares for both regulated rates and rail costs. Rail outputs 
were determined by applying the shares to existing freight 
output in each market; as a result, new traffic generated by 
lower rail rates is not considered in this procedure except 
insofar as it affects the regression coefficients and pre-
dieted shares. Finally, Levin calculated the welfare loss 
from equation 1 and found that it was between $53 and $135 
million for manufactured goods in 1972. 35 
~~~~~~~~~-~"~--~-~J:3~o.yer estimated a logi t model of traffic allocatiorr--
with a different set of explanatory variables. Using 
Harbeson's data on costs and traffic distribution and his 
own figures on rates, he concluded that the annual welfare 
loss on manufactured goods in the mid-1960s was approxi-
mately $125 million; 36 recall that Harbeson found that the 
cost of misallocated traffic was between $1.1 and $2.9 billion 
34 Levin, pp. 20-26. 
35Ibid., p. 37. Different sample sizes and cost assump-
tions produced different estimates of the welfare loss in 
the range from $53 to $135 million. 
36Kenneth Boyer, "Minimum Rate Regulation, Modal Split 
Sensitivities, and the Railroad Problem," Journal of 
Political Economy 85 (June 1977): 505. 
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per year. Levin has criticized Boyer's results for two 
reasons. First, data from several different years were used 
to estimate the logit model and compute the welfare loss. 
Second, Boyer used the observed rail share to calculate the 
area of the welfare triangle instead of the share predicted 
for the observed rail rate, thereby leaving in the welfare 
calculation the unexplained variation in the relation be-
tween market shares and rates and service quality. However, 
the direction of bias introduced by these flaws is not 
apparent. 37 
Levin has claimed that the comparative-cost approach 
overstates the misallocation between railroads and motor 
carriers even if the average service differential in each 
traffic categ is evaluated properly. The reason is 
-· - -·. -~-- . ·-·- ·--··-------·- ·--·· -· ----··--·-· -··-·-·-··-·-··----~-
simple: the low-cost mode for the representative shipper 
will not be the low-cost mode for shippers with service 
requirements or preferences sufficiently different from the 
average. In Levin's words, "to count such traffic as mis-
allocated is surely to exaggerate the extent of misalloca-
t
. ..38 ion. A comparison of the comparative-cost and modal-
split procedures, however, indicates that Levin's argument 
is generally correct for the amount of traffic misallocated 
but not for the corresponding welfare loss. 
37Levin, pp. 39-40. 
38 Ibid., p. 20. 
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In order to compare the two methods, it is convenient 
to borrow from previous studies the assumption that total 
rail and truck output in each traffic category is fixed; 
that is, the overall demand for transportation in each 
market is completely inelastic. Figure 2 illustrates the 
demand for rail service at prevailing truck rates (which 
are assumed to be equal to truck costs); as the rail rate 
falls, demand increases because shippers switch from motor 
carriers, not because new traffic is generated. The 
horizontal axis can be interpreted as rail market share or 
output. As explained in the discussion of figure 1, the 
modal-split procedure measures the welfare loss by the area 
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The comparative-cost approach adds inventory costs to 
rail long-run marginal cost to determine the low-cost mode 
in each traffic class. This adjustment is intended to 
capture the additional cost to the average shipper of the 
inferior service provided by the railroads. 39 In figure 2, 
the inventory costs are BD, and the rail cost advantage is 
DE. Since the comparative-cost procedure assigns all of 
the shipments in a particular class to the low-cost mode, 
the amount of motor carrier traffic shifted to the railroads 
is EF, and the associated cost saving is measured by the 
area of the rectangle DEFG. 
Most critics of the comparative-cost method have argued 
that its practitioners have underestimated the value of 
s rior motor carrier service. Levin has inted out that 
the usual inventory cost calculations ignore the greater 
flexibility and reliability that trucks offer. 40 It is 
possible, however, to measure the average service difference 
from the rail demand curve. 41 
39Harbeson and Friedlaender also increased motor carrier 
costs to account for an apparent deficiency in user charges. 
Other studies have focused more on the division of traffic 
that would appear in the absence of rate regulation and do 
not make such an adjustment. 
4 O Levin , p • 19 • 
41The level of service is exogenous in both the 
comparative-cost and modal-split procedures. Service quality, 
however, is a decision variable for the firm, and rail 
service has surely been adversely affected by regulatory 
constraints on pricing in different markets. 
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At any point on the demand curve, those shippers who 
would switch from truck to rail service in response to any 
decline in the rail rate must be indifferent between the two 
modes; that is, the perceived cost of using either mode must 
be the same. Therefore, the difference between the motor 
carrier and rail rates at that point on the demand curve 
measures the additional cost to the shipper of using rail 
transportation. At point I in figure 2, the difference HI 
is negative, indicating that railroads satisfy the trans-
portation requirements of the marginal shipper better than 
trucks; at point K, where the difference JK is positive, the 
opposite conclusion holds. For all shippers, the average 
service difference can be evaluated from: 
where fr = rail market share 
Rt = motor carrier rate 
pr(fr) = inverse demand function for rail service 
If the underlying distribution of shipper valuations of the 
service difference is normal, then the average can be 
determined at the point of inflection. In figure 2, X is 
the inflection point, and the average value of superior 
truck service is YX. 
If truck costs exceed rail costs by the average service 
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approach finds no difference in the cost to the representa-
.. - ~.:~·t:fve·shi·ppe r··of.:·each rri0deMa:n:a ... thereforeno .. misalToca e:-i~on .. crf-.. -.. -.. ~ .....-.. -..... ~~--~ 
traffic. This is the only case in which the comparative-
cost approach indicates a smaller amount of misallocated 
traffic than the modal-split procedure. But the welfare 
loss will be smaller under the former method if the differ-
ence between truck and rail costs is sufficiently close to 
the average service cost. 
This comparison of the two procedures in theory and 
practice reveals that the comparative-cost approach has two 
serious deficiencies. First, in assigning all shipments in 
a traffic class to the low-cost mode, it assumes that rail 
demand is perfectly elastic at a rate equal to the truck 
28 
rate less the average service cost. Levin, however, found 
that the elasticity of rail demand is not more than .3s. 42 
Second, the value of service differences has not been 
measured correctly in previous studies. Boyer has shown how 
difficult it is to identify and compute the various costs 
associated with rail or truck service instead of using the 
information on shipper preferences that is embodied in the 
demand function. 43 The comparison of the two methods, how-
ever, demonstrates that the social cost of the misallocation 
of traffic is not necessarily overstated by the comparative-
cost procedure. Consequently, the relationship between 
contending estimates in any period is an empirical issue. 
42The logit model has the property that the response of 
the market shares to a change in an independent variable is 
· ··~-- ·_.··g r-e a·f..es ~.:.whe 11 · the =tr=afric._.i s .evenly .. a·iv.i~de a.~ . IJ:e:~rtn ,_ ttI.~T~'"".:::,.... .  ~~~~=~ 
fore, obtained an upper bound for the elasticity by assuming 
an equal share of traffic for each mode. The actual 
elasticity will be larger to the extent that lower rates 
generate new traffic. Levin, p. 32. 
43Boyer, "Minimum Rate Regulation," p. 497. 
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3. A modal-split estimate of welfare losses in 1963-64 
Levin has argued that the great disparity between 
Harbeson's social cost estimate for 1963 and his own for 
1972 can be traced to a decline in the misallocation of 
traffic as well as to the choice of measurement procedure. 
Traffic allocation may have improved for two reasons. 
First, rail costs probably increased relative to rates with 
a concomitant reduction in the range of the railroads' cost 
advantage over competing modes. Second, the Commission 
apparently began to give more emphasis to cost standards in 
evaluating carrier rate proposals in the late 1960s. 44 
It is difficult to determine whether the welfare loss 
associated with traffic misallocation changed between 1963 
has been applied to both periods. A recent updating of 
Harbeson's study to 1970 found the cost of misallocated 
traffic to be a slightly smaller proportion of the cost of 
rail and truck transportation of manufactured goods than in 
1963. 45 But the deficiencies of the comparative-cost method 
and Harbeson's questionable assumption about comparable 
shipment sizes for railroads and motor carriers make any 
44 Levin, pp. 19, 40-41. 
45sparling, "Traffic Allocation," p. 21. The updating 
of the Harbeson and Friedlaender studies to 1970 is described 
in the Appendix to this chapter. 
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conclusion about changes in the misallocation of traffic 
somewhat suspect. The welfare losses obtained by Boyer 
and Friedlaender for 1963-64 are quite similar to those 
reported by Levin for 1972, but differences among their 
applications of the modal-split approach raise questions 
about the validity of the comparison. 
Levin's conjecture about an improvement in traffic 
allocation from 1963 to 1972 can best be tested by using 
the same procedure to estimate the welfare loss in each 
year. To that end, Levin's modal-split procedure is 
applied in this section to data for 1963-64. 
The first step is to estimate the logit model given by 
equation 3. Observations were obtained for markets defined 
anc:]mileage block; no further classification by 
-··-·----~--- -- --- ----··-~·-··-- --~------- --- ----------·----------·-----
shipment size was possible because the required market share 
and rail rate figures were not available. 46 Levin, however, 
also estimated the model for markets defined in this manner. 
His motive was to allow shifts among different shipment 
sizes because, for example, lower rates for large rail 
shipments encourage the consolidation and shift of smaller 
shipments from other modes. Levin found that this modifi-
cation did not substantially alter the regression results 
46commodities were limited in part by the need to use 
published rail data. More complete figures are probably 
recorded on the Commission's waybill sample tapes, but the 
oldest usable tape dates back only to 1972. 
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for 1972. 47 Complete data were available for 91 markets in 
19 three-digit STCc48 manufactured commodities, ranging from 
grain mill products to household appliances. 
Market shares of freight tonnage were computed for rail-
roads and motor carriers (for-hire and private) only. 49 It 
was not possible to separate rail traffic into boxcar and 
piggyback shipments, but the omission does not appear to be 
serious because trailer-on-flat-car service accounted for only 
2 percent of rail carloads in 1963. 50 The regression model 
consists of just one equation when two modes are considered. 
Rail rates were calculated from tonnage and revenue 
figures in each market that were obtained from the ICC's 
one-percent sample of railroad waybills. 51 Motor carrier 
~-.. -=._._~_~_. __ ~ __ ~ ___ ~~~~~~. - 4-7 · - - · ·- · ··a ·· i · b. - 1· · · · d~ a f · >::! 'l- b · - ---~-----LevJ:n- ev-i · ent. y - -e --ieve 1--tuat-marK.eEs e :tne~u cm-.1.-y_~dy _ d __ m---- .---
commodity and distance more accurately represent the 
shipper's choice problem because he concluded that "the 
more disaggregated model is not seriously misspecified." 
Levin, pp. 34-35. 
48 d d ' d. Cl 'f. . Stan ar Transportation Commo ity assi ication. 
This grouping is similar to the Standard Industrial 
Classification used in the Census of Manufactures. 
49 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
1963 Census of Transportation, Vol. III, Commodity 
Transportation Survey, Part 2, Commodity Groups (1966). 
50 Interstate Commerce Commission, 78th Annual Report 
(1964), pp. 137, 144. 
51 C C . . B . f E . Interstate ommerce ommission, ureau o conomics, 
Carload Waybill Statistics, 1964: Mileage Block Distribution 
(1967). It was necessary to use rail and truck data from 
1964 because that was the first year the ICC used the STCC. 
Before 1964 the Commission used the Freight Commodity 
Statistics Classification, and it was not possible 
.. -. · ...... ..:....:. 
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rates were not available for the markets defined here, so 
truck costs were used as a proxy for rates. The calculation 
of costs from ICC formulas is described below. 
The time performance variables were constructed from 
regression results reported by Levin that give transit time 
and its standard deviation for each mode as a function of 
distance. 52 Commodity values were determined from census 
f · f · · d 1 f h · 53 igures or intercity tonnage an va ue o s ipments. 
Cost data were required for motor carriers to estimate 
the logit model and for both modes to perform the welfare 
calculation. Most investigators of the traffic misallocation 
have used the Commission's cost formulas while criticizing 
to reconcile the two codes. 
.. . . . Mileage blocks and lengths of haul were adjusted for 
--Hmdi-fferences in--d-ist.ance.--measures-. --Tf:ie.Census_ ot-::=Tran-sp:::o·r_-;;"'.',-__ ~_==.~ .•..-~-~~ 
tation reports distances in straight-line miles, but the 
Commission uses short-line (shortest carrier route) miles 
in its waybill statistics and actual miles in its cost 
formulas. In 1963, short-line or rate-making miles exceeded 
straight-line miles on average by 24% and 21% for railroads 
and trucks, respectively, and actual miles exceeded short-
line miles by 13% and 6%. 
52Levin, pp. 28-29. 
53The intercity tonnage figures were drawn from the 
Census of Transportation and the value of shipments figures 
from the Census of Manufactures. The calculated commodity 
values are subject to some error because the data are 
reported for commodity classifications that are not iden-
tical (STCC and SIC) and because the Census of Manufactures 
figures include intracity shipments but not imports. U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1963 Census 
of Manufactures, Vol. III, Industry Statistics, Parts 1 and 
2, Commodity Groups (1966). 
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them severely. An evaluation of these cost formulas is, 
therefore, appropriate. 
In the current construction of rail freight service 
costs by the ICC, each category of operating expense is 
regressed on the relevant output variable (for example, 
yard transportation expenses on yard switching hours). 
Variables are deflated by miles of road as a carrier size 














miles of road 
output 
disturbance, 
and each observation consists of data from one railroad. 
5 
From the regression results is calculated a percent variable, 
which is used to calculate variable expenses for each cate-
gory. The percent variable is equivalent to the quotient of 
marginal and average cost as well as the elasticity of cost 
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where g = average output per mile of road 
s 
PV = percent variable 
c = cost or expense 
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The variable expenses corresponding to a particular final 
output are totaled to determine terminal costs per carload 
and per ton and line-haul costs per car-mile and per ton-
mile. This last operation requires the conversion of inter-
mediate outputs to final outputs (for example, yard switching 
hours to carloads) on the basis of industry averages. 
Actually, the Commission does not estimate the expense-
output relationship each year but instead applies to each 
expense category the percent variable obtained from a study 
covering 1966-69. This yields variable expenses for each 
category, and the calculation of terminal and line-haul costs 
oceeds in the manner described above. In addition, before 
1970 variable costs were simply taken to be 80 percent of total 
operating expenses (plus a return on equipment and property 
investment), a figure derived by estimating a variety of 
linear expense-output models for the 1930s and 1940s. 54 
For the curvilinear relationship between deflated cost 
and output that the ICC now estimates, both marginal and 
average cost and, therefore, percent variable, are a function 
54current practices are described briefly in, Interstate 
Commerce Commission, Bureau of Accounts, Rail Carload Cost 
Scales, 1975 (1978), pp. 154-155. A thorough explanation of 
procedures followed through 1969 is given in, Interstate 
Commerce Commission, Bureau of Accounts, Explanation of Rail 
Cost Finding Procedures and Principles Relating to the Use 
of Costs (1963). 
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f h 1 1 f h . . 1 55 o output, so t e eve o output c osen is crucia • 
Griliches found that the ICC produced an overall percent 
variable in 1958 of 77.6 percent by giving equal weight to 
the cost conditions of large and small firms alike (by taking 
average values for marginal and average cost). But if the 
costs of the industry as a whole are considered by giving 
equal weight to each ton-mile (by weighting each carrier's 
marginal and average cost by its share of output), the result-
56 ing percent variable is 97.4 percent. The report of an 
aggregate percent variable for 1975 of 79 percent suggests 
that this overrepresentation of small road conditions and 
underestimation of rail freight costs continue. 57 
The Commission's treatment of the size variable has 
~~~~~~~~a~l==s~o.,,_,.:..:b~e~e~n~ .. ~guestioned. Griliches has pointed out that the 
ICC specification has no particular statistical efficiency 
properties. That is, if the disturbance is assumed to be 
proportional to size, then deflation can stabilize the error 
55This is also true for the linear form estimated by the 
ICC before 1970 because average cost varies with output in 
such a relationship (if fixed costs are not zero). 
56 zvi Griliches, "Railroad Cost Analysis," Bell Journal 
of Economics and Management Science 3 (Spring 1972): 29. 
Still other weighting procedures could be used. For example, 
instead of the average carrier value for output per mile of 
road, the ICC could as well use output per mile of road for 
the entire network, that is, the quotient of total output 
and miles of road. 
57 Interstate Commerce Commission, Rail Carload Cost 
Scales, 1975, p. 154. 
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variance and improve estimator efficiency. In a linear form, 









while the ICC procedure treats: 
Griliches has also argued that the size variable is irrele-
vant, a conclusion based on regressions of total carrier 
cost on output (ton-miles) for alternative specifications 
of the influence of size. 58 However, this ignores the 
expense category regressions. In addition, Keeler has 
argued that Griliches' results are biased toward under-
stating returns to traffic density and the significance of 
the size variable. 59 
Costs incurred in the provision of both freight and 
passenger service (for example, maintenance of track ex-
penses) should be allocated to freight service only to the 
extent that such costs vary with freight output. This can 
be accomplished by including separate freight and passenger 
58 'l' h Gr1 ic es, 







output measures in the regression. The Commission, however, 
allocates common costs that are variable with an aggregate 
measure of output (gross ton-miles in freight and passenger 
service) in the same proportions as costs incurred solely 
by each service. 
Despite these problems, there are two persuasive reasons 
to use the Commission's cost formulas in determining the 
extent and cost of the traffic misallocation in 1963-64. 
First, no other cost estimates allow cost to be calculated 
for a specific shipment size and length of haul. Keeler, 
for example, reported only an overall cost per ton-mile for 
the railroads in his sample. 60 Second, using ICC costs 
facilitates comparison with other studies, particularly 
Levin's for 1972. 
Rail costs, therefore, were calculated from ICC cost 
formulas for a carload shipment moving by general service 
boxcar in an average weight train in Official territory. 61 
Motor carrier costs were based on single-line movements in 
6°Keeler's rail cost estimates are based on a specifica-
tion of the cost function that was derived from Cobb-Douglas 
production functions for freight and passenger outputs. 
Short-run total cost functions were obtained by assuming 
that a fixed amount of track was to be divided between the 
two outputs in the cost-minimization problem. Then long-run 
costs were calcul~ted from the envelope of the short-run 
functions. Keeler, pp. 20-22. 
61 Interstate Commerce Commission, Bureau of Accounts, 
Rail Carload Unit Costs by Territories for the Year 1964 
(1966). 
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Eastern-Central territory. 62 (The Eastern-Central motor 
carrier territory and Official rail territory encompass 
almost identical geographic areas.) 
The logit model in equation 3 was estimated by ordinary 
least squares. Levin noted that the error terms are hetero-
scedastic because a market share estimate has smaller variance 
when it is based on a larger number of observed shipments. 
However, it was not possible to construct the weights for 
generalized least squares estimation because the Census of 
Transportation does not provide any data on the underlying 
observations for each market. 63 




R = .456 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
9 
With the exception of b 3 , the coefficient of the reliability 
variable, the estimated coefficients have the expected signs 
and are statistically significant at the one percent level. 
62 c . . f Interstate ommerce Comm1ss1on, Bureau o Accounts, 
Cost of Transporting Freig~t by Class I and Class II Motor 
Common Carriers of General Commodities by Regions or Terri-
tories for the Year 1964 (1965). The ICC cost formulas take 
variable costs for motor carriers to be 90 percent of total 
costs. 
63Levin was also forced to use ordinary least squares. 
Levin, p. 26. 
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Levin also obtained the wrong sign for the reliability 
coefficient and blamed the result on deficiencies in the 
construction of the variable. 64 
The negative sign of the constant term indicates that 
the representative shipper in 1963-64 placed a higher value 
on the unmeasured service characteristics (attributes other 
than transit time and reliability) of motor carriers than on 
those of railroads. Indeed, if the two modes had offered 
identical rates, transit time, and reliability, the railroads 
would have captured only 30 percent of the total traffic 
because of their poor performance in other service areas 
of importance to shippers, and truck rates 57 percent higher 
than existing rail rates would have been required for the 
railroads to obtain an even division of the traffic. 65 
The rate coefficient, b 1 , can be used to estimate the 
elasticity of demand for rail transportation. That is: 
= 
64 b'd 32 . I 1 ., p. • 
fr 
!Hn--
1-f r 10 
65Both figures were derived from the estimated equation. 
The second is based on an average rail rate of $12.95 per 
ton, calculated as the ratio of sample revenue and tons. 
The revenue per ton for all shipments of manufactured goods 
by railroad in 1964 was $10.78. Interstate Commerce 
Commission, Bureau of Accounts, Freight Commodity Statistics, 
Class I Railroads in the United States for 1964 (1967). 
, ... , ....... . 
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Rr aqr 
nr = -qr ()Rr 
Rr afr 
= qT qr aRr 
= - b 1 (1-f )R r r 
where nr = elasticity of demand for rail 
transportation 
qr = rail output 
qT = total output (rail + truck) 
Levin noted from equation 10 that the rail market share is 
most responsive to rate changes when traffic is evenly 
divided and evaluated equation 11 by assuming a 50 percent 
11 
rail share and average rail rates. He obtained an elasticity 
oe .13 ··for tfre·moae-1~-specificati-on-most·sim-ilar-=-to. the--·one 
adopted here. 66 But Levin's calculation ignores the fact 
that market shares are not independent of rates. Observed 
shares and rates should instead be used to estimate elastic-
ities from equation 11. Following that procedure yields 
elasticities of .81 for the sample markets and .70 for all 
manufactured goods in 1963-64. 67 
6 6Lev in, p ._3.5 .• __ ._Unl_e.S..S~~.tlt§J:J'!J.Eg= ?.1:.Ci.t~f:l.c, ..... the 
figures attributed to Levin in this section are his results 
for a specification that used variable costs and markets 
defined only by commodity and length of haul. 
67The logit model was estimated here with rates and 
values expressed in dollars per hundredweight, so the rates 
in footnote 65 required conversion. The rail market shares 
41 
Given Levin's rate coefficient, the elasticity of demand 
for rail shipment of manufactured goods was found to be .20 
in 1972. 68 Since the average rail rate was lower and the 
rail share higher in 1963 than in 1972, the higher elasticity 
for 1963 can be attributed entirely to the higher estimate of 
the rate coefficient. For rates expressed in dollars per 
hundredweight, the estimates of b1 are 2.32 and .46 for 1963 
and 1972, respectively. The logit curve (shown, for example, 
in figure 2) is flatter for a higher rate coefficient, but 
there is no obvious explanation for such a shift between the 
two years. 
The regression results can also be used to estimate the 
welfare loss from rate regulation. Market shares were cal-
culated from the estimated equation for existing rail rates 
and for rail costs; it was necessary to predict market shares 
for observed rates in order to control for the unexplained 
variation in observed shares. Outputs were computed by apply-
ing the estimated market shares to existing output, and the 
for the sample and for all manufactures were 46% and 44% 
respectively. The latter figure was obtained from, U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 1963 Census of Transportation. 
68Modal shares for 1972 are given in, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1972 Census of Transportation, 
Vol. III, Commodity Transportation Survey, Part 3, Area 
Statistics, South and West Regions and U.S. Summary (1976). 
The average railroad revenue per ton for STCC codes 20-39 was 
drawn from, Interstate Commerce Commission, Bureau of Accounts, 
Freight Commodity Statistics, Class I Motor Carriers of Prop-
erty Operating in Intercity Service--Common and Contract in 
the United States, 1972 (1973). 
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welfare loss in each market was calculated directly from 
equation 1 as half the product of the differences in prices 
and outputs. 
For the 91 markets considered here, the annual social 
cost of the traffic misallocation in 1963-64 was $120 million 
or 1.97 percent of sample revenue. Assuming that this proper-
tion applied to all shipments of manufactured goods, the 
annual welfare loss on manufactured goods was approximately 
$228 million. 69 The corresponding figures reported by Levin 
for 1972 are .43 percent and $75 million, suggesting that the 
cost of the misallocation declined. 
69Total rail and truck revenue on shipments of manufac-
tured goods in 1963 was obtained by applying sample rates to 
census traffic figures. 
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4. Assessing the results 
The purposes of this concluding section are to compare 
the various estimates of the cost of the traffic misalloca-
tion and to consider the policy and research implications of 
the result. Table 1 summarizes the welfare loss estimates 
that have been reviewed or developed in this paper. 
The first of two basic conclusions that can be drawn from 
a comparison of misallocation studies is that comparative-
cost procedures have overstated the social cost of rate 
regulation. 
It was shown in section 2 that the comparative-cost 
approach does not necessarily produce a larger welfare loss 
estimate than the modal-split method, and updating 
-------···-------- _ __._F'rieaTaenaer. 1 s __ compar.afive-:.c-o-s:::t: __ pro~~e:::d~u:~e_:t:::o .... l-~)7:Q:=px:g:gJJ:<::·e:<:t~_-....• -. ~~~~~ 
an estimate not completely out of line with modal-split 
results. Even Harbeson's extreme results can be explained by 
his comparison of different shipment sizes for railroads and 
motor carriers. Since Friedlaender's procedure compares 
costs for the same shipment sizes for both modes but is 
otherwise similar to Harbeson's method (even in the con-
struction of inventory costs70 ), the difference in results 
can be attributed to Harbeson's peculiar criterion for 
70 Keeler has argued that Harbeson's estimates of the 
welfare loss are high because inventory costs were under-
stated. Keeler, p. 30. 
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Study Year Welfare loss* 
Comparative-cost 
Meyer 1958 $1 billion 
1 
Harbeson 1963 $1.l - 2.9 billior 
Friedlaender 1963 ?2 
-
Harbeson (update) 1970 $.7 - 4.2 billion-
-












$53 - 135 million 
$228 million4 
*For manufactured goods (except Meyer) and in current dollars 
1Meyer found that the rail cost advantage for shipments over 
200 miles was approximately 2 cents per ton-mile; the cost 
saving was obtained by applying that figure to all truck 
traffic moving over 200 miles. 
2Qualitative estimate only: misallocation in favor of motor 
carriers for shipments weighing less than 40 tons and moving 
more than 200 miles. 
3Procedure described in Appendix. 




determining the low-cost mode in each mileage block. 71 
Nevertheless, the comparative-cost approach has two 
serious deficiencies. First, it embodies an unrealistic 
conception of shipper choice because it assumes that rail 
demand is perfectly elastic at one rate (equal to the truck 
rate less the imputed cost of inferior rail service) and 
completely inelastic elsewhere. Second, the comparative-
cost method ignores the information on shipper evaluations 
of service differences that is contained in the demand 
function and instead relies on a complicated compilation 
of inventory costs. The modal-split approach is superior 
in both respects because it derives the welfare loss from 
an estimated demand relationship. 
Therefore, the welfare loss in 1972 was more likely 
-------------------- ---------------------- -------------------- -- -- -~---------- --- ----------------------~ ------
$100 million than $1 billion or more. Even the lower figure 
is an overstatement because the modal-split procedures have 
used motor carrier costs as a proxy for rates. The assump-
tion that rates equal costs for motor carriers also conceals 
any shift of traffic from railroads to trucks that might 
result from the elimination of rate regulation. Whenever 
reliable motor carrier rate data become available, modal-
71Boyer used Harbeson's cost figures (and, therefore, 
Harbeson's assumption about comparable shipment sizes), but 
his results are not very different from other modal-split 
estimates. Boyer, "Minimum Rule Regulation," pp. 505-507. 
The reason is that the difference between rail and truck 
rates or costs affects the modal-split welfare calculation 
only through the estimation of the logit model. 
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split traffic shifts and welfare losses should be refigured 
because it is important for an understanding of regulation to 
know the redistribution of traffic that it produces. This 
point is discussed below in more detail. 
The second basic conclusion to be drawn from the mis-
allocation studies is that the welfare loss from regulation 
of rates fell between 1963 and 1972. 
The various modal-split studies cover different years, 
but differences in model specifications and data sources 
make comparison of the results somewhat difficult. For that 
reason, Levin's procedure was applied to 1963 data, and it 
was found that the welfare loss on rail and truck shipments 
of manufactured goods declined from 1.97 percent of total 
revenue in 1963 to .43 rcent in 1972. 
----------------------------- ---------- ---~~------------- -·--"··-----·-------. -- ----- -------------------------- - -- - ------------- 7 -------------- --
Levin suggested that the cost of the misallocat on 
fallen since the early 1960s, but his reasoning is unper-
suasive. His conjecture that "rising rail costs have prob-
ably narrowed the gap between rates and marginal costs" 72 is 
belied by his report of a ratio of rail revenue to variable 
cost for manufactured goods of 1.47 in 1961 and 1.45 in 
1972. 73 In the markets examined here for 1963, the ratio 
was slightly higher at 1.53. These figures also raise some 
, question about the significance of Levin's evidence that the 





Commission is now more inclined to use variable cost as the 
. . d d 74 minimum rate stan ar • Furthermore, Levin pointed out 
that the ratio of rail revenue to variable cost did not vary 
much across his sample of manufactured commodities (which 
suggested a weakening of value-of-service pricing) and that 
rail costs have risen faster than truck costs. 75 But these 
observations do not explain the reduced welfare loss. The 
relative increase of rail costs and, therefore, rates (because 
of the constancy of the rail markup), for example, can be 
depicted as an upward shift of their levels relative to the 
demand curve shown in figures 2 and 3, but the conditions 
necessary for the welfare loss over all markets to decline 
are not apparent. As a result, the reasons for the fall in 
~~~~~~~~the welfare loss remain a question for further research. 
These conclusions must be interpreted with some caution 
because of the shortcomings of the analysis. Some of the 
problems inherent in the Commission's cost formulas were 
outlined in section 2, and changes in its estimation pro-
cedures after 1970 may have contributed to the difference 
in the welfare loss estimates for 1963 and 1972. There is 
74 Levin cited both a Commissioner's statement that rate 
decreases have not been den-ied-when-the carrier's proposed 
rate :remained above _its variable cost and the low rejection 
rate for tariff filings. Ibid., pp. 40-41. The second, of 
course is not very conclusive if carriers have adapted to 
established policy and practice regarding rate proposals. 
75 Ibid., p. 41. 
·- . .::_ 
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also an implicit assumption that the aggregate cost and 
output data reflect the conditions prevailing in individual 
markets. But with carriers operating routes at different 
points on different cost curves, it is unlikely that cost 
relationships estimated from observations of carrier total 
cost and output hold in particular markets for transport 
services. 76 However, the alternative of evaluating more 
precisely the existing misallocations at the market level 
and then aggregating is obviously impractical because the 
data requirements are prohibitive and because reallocations 
in any one market necessarily affect cost conditions in 
connected or related markets. 
In addition, the welfare loss estimates are based on a 
~~~~~~~~ ..~9.-U~E:stiona_ble concept of efficient traffic allocation. As 
stated in section 1, optimal allocation may require a rate 
structure similar to value-of-service pricing. Furthermore, 
the rate structure likely to prevail in the absence of rate 
regulation cannot be determined without additional study of 
industry structure and market strategy questions. 
Finally, the analysis is a partial equilibrium approach 
76 For example, estimates of economies of density that 
are based on the cost and output reported for an entire net-. 
work will be incorrect. If there are economies of traffic: 
density in a particular operation (for example, line-haul), 
then aggregating cost and output over all routes will lead 
to an understatement of those economies. Unfortunately, the 
ICC figures on which all econometric cost studies have been 
based are collected at the carrier or firm level. 
····-·-·-····-
. .. :--·-···•-":. -·-···-~·-'~ ····~,. ·····-~~-~-·-··. 
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to the study of regulatory reform. Other modes and commodity 
groups should be included in the modal-split studies. In 
addition, the influence of rate regulation on network opera-
tions, service levels, and innovation should be ascertained 
because they, in turn, affect costs and shipper evaluations. 
This interaction becomes more complex when more extensive 
regulatory change is contemplated; liberalized licensing 
requirements for motor carriers and abandonment procedures 
for railroads, for example, will affect the costs that 
determine the efficient distribution of traffic. Obviously, 
. 77 a more comprehensive approach is required. 
An alternative procedure is to model the pricing and 
investment decisions that a carrier will make under various 
................ ·····. 97 ........................ ················. . . .. 
------ ---···-----·----·----- -Ano ther--e xampl·e of-·a ··pa rt-ial--equ-il-ib r-ium:. res ult. with- ::._.:_ 
important policy implications is the assertion that "(motor 
carrier) rates would fall 20 percent generally if regulation 
of trucking were eliminated." Thomas Moore, "Deregulating 
Surface Freight Transportation," in Promoting Competition 
in Regulated Markets, ed. Almarin Phillips (Washington: 
The Brookings Institution, 1975), pp. 55-98. Also see 
Friedlaender, p. 74. This figure is drawn from the experi-
ence of deregulation of certain agricultural goods in the 
mid-1950s. Surveys by the Department of Agriculture found 
that rates fell an average of 33 percent for fresh poultry, 
36 percent for frozen poultry, and 19 percent for frozen 
fruits and vegetables. If the lower rates reflected the 
opportunities for previously unauthorized regulated and 
exempt carriers to obtain greater return loads, then it is 
c 1 ear -tha-t-the.,--r e du cti on:---canno~t-be-ex:.t.e.n.d_e_d...:c..t_o_d_e r_e_g_u l c;i ti Qn__ 
in all products. However, the USDA studies provide no direct 
evidence on this point. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
Interstate Trucking of Fresh and Frozen Poultry under Agri-
cultural Exemption, Marketing Research Report No. 224 (1958) 
and U.S. Department of Agriculture, Interstate Trucking of 
Frozen Fruits and Vegetables under Agricultural Exemption, 
Marketing Research Report No. 316 (1959). 
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technological, market, and regulatory constraints. Absent 
regulation, the firm can be viewed as maximizing some objec-
tive function (profits, for example) with respect to the 
rates it sets and the capital (rolling stock) it assigns to 
various transportation markets. Here the carrier is a multi-
product firm whose markets are defined by shipment of a 
commodity from one point to another. Production in these 
markets is characterized in part by the geographic connection 
of the markets and the joint product nature of the round trip 
as the firm's production unit. Regulation can be considered 
a set of constraints on the pricing (rates conforming to a 
value-of-service pricing structure) and investment (common 
carrier obligations in the face of stochastic demand and 
entry or exit restrictions) policies of the carrier. 
In view of the general agreement among economists that 
regulation adversely affects economic efficiency, the imper-
tant research questions become "Who benefits from the various 
regulatory policies?" and "Why are those policies maintained?" 
The modeling approach is valuable because it can indicate the 
impact of regulation and regulatory change on both carriers 
and shippers. It is likely that the model can be more easily 
'-~anaJ,_yzgsL Q~_f'.J?~IJ!:Rg1::J,._Q<J=~~S~9cc-9:f:~~gl.l ~J~~ccE>f}llI!l;c=<;cQri_<Li.jjQI}§_ J:.h-~D-~!2Y CCC~~~==-= ~; 
explicitly solving for optimal prices and allocations, so the 
model probably will not yield a more reliable estimate of the 
welfare loss than those obtained above (although it may iden-
tify variables that affect the loss). But since regulatory 
51 
reform remains a controversial issue, any contribution that 
the modeling approach can make to an understanding of the 
regulatory process justifies its consideration. 
'·"' ..... ,~ ...... _; . ., .. ~~·-·· ...... , .. , .. , ... _.;_., . - ,.,-... -~· ~-..: 
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APPENDIX 
The Harbeson and Friedlaender comparative-cost results 
were updated and revised in the following way. Basic ter-
minal and line-haul expenses were obtained from ICC cost 
studies for 1970 78 and adjusted to account for user charge 
deficiencies and service differences related to time in 
transit, minimum shipment sizes, and pickup and delivery. 
User charge increases for motor carriers were set at 
1.8 cents per vehicle-mile. This figure was obtained by 
selecting 1.6 cents per vehicle-mile (the midpoint of the 
range suggested by Friedlaender79 ) as the relevant figure 
for 1965 and increasing it to 1970 price levels with the 
wholesale price index for construction materials and com-
ponents. 
The transit time difference between rail and motor 
carriage can be approximated by: 
78 Interstate Commerce Commission, Bureau of Accounts, 
Rail Carload Cost Scales by Territories for the Year 1970 
(1973), pp. 114-134, and Interstate Commerce Commission, 
Bureau of Accounts, Cost of Transporting Freight_J:?.y Class I 
and Class II Motor Common Carriers of General Commodities 
by Regions or Territories for the Year 1970 (1972°)~ pp. 25-
193. 
79Friedlaender, p. 38. 
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T = (mr _ mt ) 1 mr [ mr ( 6 ) mt ( 3 )] 20 37.5 + • 20 + 250 - 250 
mr 
+ 140(8) + 48 
where T = time in hours 
mr = rail miles 
mt = truck miles 
The first term represents the difference in average speeds 
of 20 mph for railroads and 37.5 mph for trucks, the second 
allows for rail time spent on sidings enroute, the third 
represents the difference in time required for interchanges 
at 250-mile intervals, the fourth is the rail time related 
to switching at intermediate terminals, and the last repre-
sents slower terminal handling at origin and destination. 
The cost of the difference in transit time is given by: 
Inventory cost (transit) = T If) 
where V = commodity value 
i = interest premium 80 H = 8760 hours per year 
The cost was calculated for: 
V = $1000 per ton 
i = 15 percent per year 
The value figure was derived from census figures on commodity 
80 The parameters of the time equation were taken from 
recent studies. For the basic formulation, see Meyer et al., 
pp • 19 2-19 3 • 
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81 volumes and from wholesale prices of individual products. 
The selection of representative goods for each census group 
reflected a bias toward overestimation of the average value. 
The inventory cost associated with different minimum 
loads can be estimated from: 
Inventory cost (size) = (Vi + K) (L - Lt) + S(]:_ 
2Q r Lr 
where K = annual storage cost 
Q = annual shipment volume in tons 
s = ordering charge 
L = minimum rail load 




The first term is the working capital and storage cost of the 
larger inventory required for the larger and less frequent 
rail shipments, and the second is the additional ordering 
-- --· .......... -............ -· ···-· - ... - ·- -·. -· ....... - 8-2.----.'='~~--,.-~-~---~ ------···-··-- -----~----expense-of--the-more- frequent~t-ruck:-shipments-. ---The~cost- ----------
was evaluated for: 
v = $1000 per ton 
i = 15 percent per year 
K = $100 per ton 
Q = 5000 tons 
s = $10 per order 
L = 25.6 tons (Harbeson), r (Friedlaender) 
15-50 tons 
Lt = 12.2 tons (Harbeson), 10 tons (Friedlaender) 
81u.s. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
------==l'-9,6=7.::.:.·Cens us- of T r-.:ansp.0,r~ta-tion-rc~Nol-.:L_I,,.I-I-,-,--Commod it y 'I' r ansp.or -
tation Survey, Part 1, Shipper-·Groups-(1970) and ·interstate 
Commerce Commission, Bureau of Transport Economics and 
Statistics, Freight Revenue and Wholesale Value at Destination 
of Commodities Transported by Class I Line-haul Railroads 
(1961) 
82Meyer et al., pp. 190-192. 
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The result was a small net charge against motor carriers for 
all but the largest rail shipments, so in the interest of 
overstating the case for motor carriers, no adjustment of 
basic costs was made. 
Pickup and delivery costs for the Eastern-Central 
territory in 1970 were added to rail terminal costs because 
the railroads' terminal service is limited to spotting freight 
cars on industrial sidings, while motor carriers usually 
provide complete pickup and delivery on through shipments. 
Meyer has shown that the expense of maintaining and operating 
a private siding can exceed the cost of truck pickup and 
d 1 . 
83 . . t bl t . 1 d t k e ivery, so it is no unreasona e o inc u e rue 
pickup and delivery expense as a cost of door-to-door rail 
service. A maximum truck load of 30 tons was assumed. 
Misallocation losses were determined by comparing cost-
based allocations with traffic distribution figures classified 
by length of haul only or by both size of shipment and 
length of haul for 1967. 84 Distribution figures by size of 
shipment and length of haul were published only for the 
individual commodity classes, so it was necessary to prepare 
the aggregate figures required here. 
average loads of 12.2 tons per vehicle for Class I intercity 
83 rbid., p. 189. 
84 U.S. Department of Commerce, 1967 Census of 
Transportation. 
:. ;: .. 
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motor common carriers and 25.6 tons per car for Class I 
railroads. Although these figures are averages for all 
commodity traffic, the motor carrier load should be accurate 
because manufactures account for more than 80 percent of 
trucking tonnage. Railroads, however, carry a much larger 
proportion of bulk commodities, so 25.6 tons per car is 
probably an overestimate of the average manufactures load. 
This error is offset to some extent by the fact that the 
calculated rail costs apply to carload shipments and not all 
h
. 85 s ipments. Motor carrier costs were computed for a 
single-line movement with no intermediate transfer, while 
rail costs were based on shipment in a general service, 
unequipped boxcar in an average weight train. Costs were 
calculated ~or dis~a~ces corresponding to the census mileage 
blocks. An allowance for circuity was made because the 
census figures are reported for straight-line miles. Short-
line or rate-making miles exceed straight-line miles by 24 
percent and 21 percent for railroads and trucks, respectively, 
and actual miles exceed rate-making miles by 16 percent and 
6 percent on average. Therefore, census mileages were 
increased by 44 percent for railroads and 28 percent for 
The welfare loss was then determined by evaluating the 
85 The average load figures were drawn from, Interstate 
Commerce Commission, Bureau of Accounts, Transport Statistics 
in the United States, Year ending December 31, 1970, Part 1, 
Railroads, and Part 7, Motor Carriers (1973). 
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savings at each distance of reassigning all traffic to the 
low-cost mode and then summing the individual components. 
The steps and results of this computation are shown in 
table 2 for the lowest regional motor carrier costs and 
highest regional rail costs and in table 3 for the highest 
motor carrier and lowest rail cost scales. The lowest 
regional costs for motor carriers were reported for the 
Southern (Intra) region for the first seven mileage blocks 
and the Southwest region for the remaining five; the 
highest rail costs appeared in the Mountain Pacific and 
Transterritory for the first mileage block and in the New 
England region for all others. These costs were used in 
table 2. For table 3, the highest motor carrier costs 
.. were r~ported for the Transcontinental territory for the 
first five blocks and the New England region - Group II 
for the remaining seven; the lowest rail costs appeared 
in the Southern region for all mileage blocks. 
Friedlaend~r's procedure requires costs for several 
specific shipment sizes. Motor carrier costs were based 
on weighted average single and interline movements in 
Eastern-Central territory and rail costs on average freight 
car costs in an average weight train in Official territory. 
Terminal and line-haul costs for a representative freight 
car were obtained by weighting individual car costs by 
the proportions of the total in service in the Eastern 
district at the close of 1970. Following Friedlaender, no 
-i 
! ii 
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$/ B oc.k •. 25 75 150 250 . 350 450 550 700 900 1100 1350 1750 
Midpoint I, 
Motor Carrie·r Costs 
I 
I 
Terminal+ . 5. 62· 7.81 IO. 4. 9 14. 18 1 • 18. 05 21. 88" 25.46 31. 13 36.03 43.02 51. 76 65.74 line-haul I 
6 user charge • 05 • 14 .29 .48 .67 • 86 I. 06 1.34 1.73 2.11 2.59 . 3. 36 
TOTAL 5.67 7.95 10.78 14.66 18. 72 . 22. 74 . 26.52 32.47 .37, 76 45.13 54.35 69.10 
Rail Costs 
U1 
co . Terminal+ 
4.20 5.14 6.99 9.45 11. 91 14. 37 16.84 20.53 25.45 30.37 36.53 46.37 line-haul 
Inventory --
• 88 1.00 1.19 I. 44 1 1. 68 transit time 1. 93 2.18 2.55 3.05 3.54 4.16 5.16 
Pickup & Delivery 2. 72 2. 72 2. 72 2. 72 2. 72 2.72 -:>..n 2. 72 2. 72 2. 72 2.72 2.72 . 
TOTAL 7.80 8.86 10.90 13.61 16.31 19.02 21. 74 25. 80 31. 22 36.63 43. 41 54.Z'i 
Rail Cost Advantage - 2. 13 -. 91 -. 12 I. 05 2.41 3.72 4.78 6.67 6.54 8.50 10. 94 14.85 
High-Cost Carrier 
27167 41444 69027 47825 130930 Traffic 17845 13259 20041 10095 4899 3570 3357 
(thousands of tons) 
Net Loss ($1, 000) 57,866 37, 714 8. 283 . 50. 216 ir· 541 66. 383 63, 378 133, 673 66,021 41,642 39,056 49,851 




Maximum Motor Carrier ~1sts vs. Minimum Rail Costs 




25 75 150 250 1 ,I 350 450 550 700 900 1100 1350 1750 $/Ton Bl.oc:-k . I 
. Midpoint I 
! 
Motor Carrier Coats 
Terminal+ 11. 37 13.95 15.95 19°.19 i I 22. 10 27.05 32.05 39.54 49.54 59.33 n. 03 92.02 
line-haul I 
fJ. user charge .05 .14 .29 • 48 i I • 61 • 86 
i 
i'. 06 1. 34 1. 73 Z.11 Z.59 3. 36 . 
TOTAL· 11.42 14.09 16.24 19. 67 I I 23. 37 . 21·. 91 33.11 40.88 51. 27 61. 44 74.62 95.38 
I 
Rail Costs I I 
I 
Terminal+ 2.-64 3.28 4.24 s. 52 I I 6.80 8.08 line-haul 9.36" 11. 28 13.84 16.41 19.61 24.73 
Ul 
\0 
Inventory -- • 88 1.00 
transit time 
1. 19 1.441 I 1.68 I. 93 2.18 2.55 3.05 3.54 4.16 5.16 
Pickup & delivery Z.72 2. 72 2. 72 z. n 11 z. n 2. 72 2.72 2.12 2.72 2.72 2.72 2. 7Z 
TOTAL 6.24 7.00 8.15 9.68!1 11.20 12. 73 14. 26 16.55 19. 61 22.67 26. 49 32.61 
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Traffic 73474 67326 74193 47825 i I 30930 17845 13259 20041 10095 4899 3570 3357 
(thousands of tons) 
600,221 477,771
1
376,418 270,887 249,932 487,598 319,608 189,934 171,824 210,719 Net Loss ($1,000) 380,595 477,341 
· 1 I 




consolidation of small shipments was made, but her assumption 
of a 20-ton maximum load for motor vehicles was revised to a 
30-ton limit; since the weighted average capacity of all 
terminal-to-terminal vehicles in the Eastern-Central territory 
is approximately 20 tons, it was assumed that 30-ton vehicles 
(at average commodity density) are available for these 
h . 86 s ipments. 
Higher terminal costs and lower line-haul costs for 
railroads relative to trucks at all shipment sizes indicated 
a rail cost advantage at longer distances. Therefore, the 
costs were used to determine the distances beyond which rail 
shipment is more efficient than motor carriage. Again, 
circuity adjustments were made by increasing line-haul costs 
~~~~~~~~.~.-b~( 44 percent and 28 percent for railroads and trucks, respec-
tively. The estimated distances identified an efficient 
allocation, and the modal distribution figures were used to 
determine the potential traffic shifts. Traffic shifts were. 
based on an extrapolation of the traffic statistics that was 
linear with respect to both weight and distance; that is, a 
distance of 260 miles required a shift from railroads to trucks 
of 30 percent of the rail traffic in the 200-399 mileage block 
for the appropriate weight. . Shipment~_c9~f?J:c:J:::~oJilp9nemJ::§~c::u:J~ .<:lj,.s- .. 
played in table 4 and the calculated distances and resulting 
traffic shift in table 5. The distances reported are 
86 c c . . c f . Interstate ommerce omm1ss1on, ost o Transport1n9 
Freight by Class I and Class II Motor Common Carriers, p. 22. 
Table 4 
Rail and Motor Ca~rier CostJ ~y Size of Shipment 
970) 
I ; 
Terminal Cos.ts - $/ton 
Line-haul Costs - $/ton-mile 
s1 · I i ts· · T 11pman · ize in ono 
1· i . 
1 5 10 . ! 15. 20 30 40 - 50 
Motor Carrier Costs 
BASIC TERMINAL 29.64 14.68 7.84 s .. 20 4.06 3.62 4.04 3.80 
Basic line-haµl .5230 • "r073 • 0531 
ii 
• 0260 • 0176 • 0260 • i • 0353 • 0210 
i 
/::,.user.charge . 0180 • 0036 • 0018 I • 0012 .0009 • 0006 • 0009 • 0007 .. 
TOTAL LINE-HAUL • 5410 • 1109 • 0549 • i. 0365 
1 
• 0269 • 0182 • 0269 .0217 
Rail Costs 0\ 
i I-' 
Basic terminal 98.95 19.79 9.90 "6.60 4.95 3.30 2.48 1. 99 
Inventory-terminal 
• 82 • 82 • 82 I. 82 .. 82 • 82 • 82 • 82 
·handling time : 
I 
Pick-up_ & delivery 14.08 7.66 5.14 14.04 3.08 2. 72 3.08 Z.86 
•I . 
TOTAL TERMINAL 113. 85 . 28. 27 15. 86 1.46 8.85 6.84 6.38 5.67 
• i 
Basic Line-haul • 2935 • 0606 
ii 
.• 0169 .• 0314 • ! • 0217 • 0120 • 0096 • 0081 
Inventory-transit 
• 0017 • 0017 • 0017 • 0017 . 0017 • 0017 .0017 • 0017 
time 
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straight-line mileages. 
Friedlaender's procedure was extended by estimating the 
cost savings of the traffic shifts in table 5. The cost 
difference between modes was calculated at the midpoint of 
each census mileage block for each shipment size and applied 
to the relevant traffic. Mileage blocks in which the cost 
advantage changed from trucks to railroads were divided into 
two new blocks at the equal-cost distance and treated in the 
same way. For example, the 600-999 mileage block was divided 
for a 20-ton shipment at the minimum efficient rail distance 
of 630 miles; then cost differences were calculated at the 
new midpoints of 615 and 815 miles and multiplied by the 
relevant rail and truck tonnages, respectively. Shipments 
of less than 7.5 tons were not considered because most such 
shipments are not carload shipments, for which the ICC reports 
rail costs. This excluded traffic accounted for about 10 
percent of the rail and motor common and contract carrier 
tonnage given in the census figures. The cost savings of a 
reassignment of the remaining traffic totaled approximately 
$400 million per year, so the welfare loss for all manufac-
tured goods is probably less than $500 million per year. 
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CHAPTER II 
INTERMODAL COMPETITION AND RATE REGULATION 
IN A TRANSPORTATION NETWORK 
Most studies of the effects of rate regulation by the 
ICC have assumed that rates would equal long-run marginal 
costs in the absence of such regulation. 1 Some attention 
has been given to unregulated pricing in individual markets 
characterized by economies of density or served by only one 
railroad,
2 
but the effect of market interdependence in a 
network has been ignored. This paper focuses on the pricing 
and examines the pricing and welfare effects of competition 
and regulation. Competition in particular markets alters 
the demand conditions faced by the firm, and regulations 
are imposed as constraints on its behavior. 
A network model offers a different perspective on the 
beneficiaries of regulation, knowledge of which is crucial 
for understanding why regulation is maintained in its 
1 For a review of studies addressing the effect of 
rate regulation on traffic allocation, see chapter I above. 
2witness the concern in Congress about the lack of 
protection for captive shippers in current proposals to 
reform railroad regulation. 
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present form. 3 Most evaluations of regulation have focused 
on its effects on both carriers and relative rates for 
various commodity groups, as evidenced by the extensive 
discussion of value-of-service pricing. This formulation 
of the network model, however, emphasizes rate differences 
related to market location, a phenomenon that has been 
neglected beyond the observation that high-density routes 
subsidize low-density ones. 
While the operations research literature examines 
in detail flows in networks with fixed demands, there 
have been few previous attempts to analyze pricing with 
elastic demands. Charnes and his associates have examined 
the question from the perspectives of the carrier 4 and the 
5 regulator but have not gone beyond stating the maximization 
have developed a method for computing solutions in a surplus 
maximization problem. 6 Braeutigam has obtained pricing 
3welf are analysis is a means of totaling the gains 
and losses associated with a change in regulation; but the 
net result is not a sure guide to the prospects for change 
because the affected parties differ in their incentives 
and abilities to vote or influence policy. 
4A. Charnes et. al., "Chance Constrained Models for 
Transport Pricing and Scheduling under Competition," 
Transportation Science 2 (February 1968): 57-76. 
5A. Charnes et. al., "Regulatory Models for Pricing 
and Evaluation of Transport Services," Transportation 
Science 6 (February 1972): 15-31. 
6Michael Florian and Sang Nguyen, "A Method for 
Computing Network Equilibrium with Elastic Demands," 
Transportation Science 8 (November 1974): 321-332. 
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and regulatory conditions for welfare maximization under 
intermodal competition when a multi-product mode faces a break-
even constraint. 7 The emphasis here is on the firm's pricing 
decisions instead of optimal prices, and some structure is 
added to the problem by considering carrier decisions 
in a network and by basing rate constraints on the costs 
observed in the network. Finally, Friedlaender and her 
associates are incorporating network constraints similar 
to those used here in a simulation approach to the evalu-
t . f 1 h . . 8 a ion o regu atory c ange in transportation. 
This paper is divided into three sections. The first 
derives the prof it-maximizing conditions for a rail mono-
polist in a general network. Section 2 examines the effect 
of competition and regulation in a simple three-node, two-
link network. Finally, section 3 outlines the policy and 
research conseguences of the network model. 
7Ronald Braeutigam, "Optimal Pricing with Intermodal 
Competition," American Economic Review 69 (March 1979): 
38-49. 
8 U.S. Department of Transportation, Alternative 
·Scenarios for Federal Transportation Policy: Second Year 
Final Report under Contract DOT-RSPA-DPB-50-78-32, 2 
vols. (1978). 
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1. The general model 
The. network is composed of n nodes and m links. For any 
node k, ek is the set of nodes linked to k; that is, there is 
a link between k and any member of ek. 
A market for transportation exists from one node to 
another. There are n(n-1) markets in the network. 
is: 






where = number of carloads of product shipped from i 
to j 
= number of cars (loaded and empty) moved from 
k to 1 on the link between those nodes; note 
that ~l is not necessarily equal to elk 
TI = profits 
= inverse demand function for transportation 
from i to j 
n 
gi( .j.qij) = terminal cost for all carloads originating at 
Jr1 node i 




1 if carloads qij traverse link kl, 
0 if not 
The first term in the objective function (expression 1) is 
total revenue over all transportation markets. The second term 
is the sum of the terminal costs of traffic originating at each 
node. The third term is the sum of line-haul costs on each 
link. This specification assumes that there is no difference 
in the line-haul cost for loaded or empty cars; accounting for 
the increased cost of moving a loaded car would only introduce 
a cost term similar to the terminal cost for each carload. 
The terminal and line-haul costs in this formulation correspond 
to the usual operating and capacity costs in the peak-load 
pricing literature. 
The 2m constraints given by condition 2 require that the 
number of carloads of product shipped in e ther d rect on on 
any link not exceed the number of cars moved by the firm. The 
coefficients at~ indicate the routing for any market and are 
assumed to be given. Since these conditions require that the 
firm supply enough capacity on each link to satisfy the market 
demands generated by its prices, they are labelled capacity 
constraints. The last n constraints expressed by equation 3 
are termed conservation constraints because they require that 
the net flow of cars out of each node be zero. 
The first order conditions for a maximum, assuming 
positive values for all qij and ckl' are given by: 
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w.r.t. 
I Il ij 
MR· ' - gi - L: L: akl µkl 1 J k 1 ek 
= 0 4 
5 
n n ij 
µkl: µkl > 0; ckl > L: L: akl qiji - - i¥j 
n n ij 
µkl[ckl - L: L: akl q· ·] = 0 1] Ga,b,c 
where 
i¥j 
MRij = marginal revenue in market ij 
µkl = capacity constraint multiplier 
ok = conservation constraint multiplier 
Conditions 6b and 7 are, of course, equivalent to constraints 
2 and 3, respectively. 
7 
At the solution, some of the capacity constraints will be 
satisfied as equalities. Then the second order conditions 
require that a particular sequence of principal minors of the 
bordered Hessian matrix alternates in sign. It is assumed 
throughout that these conditions are satisfied. 
The µ's in equation 4 can be interpreted as capacity 
charges and the sum as the cost of moving an extra car on 
the route required for a market. Condition 4 then is the 
familiar profit-maximizing rule for a monopolist: marginal 
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revenue equals marginal cost, which here is the sum of 
incremental terminal and line-haul or capacity costs. If 
there is excess capacity in one direction on a link, so 
> 
then, from equation 6c, µkl = 0. That is, no capacity 
charges are incurred when there are empty cars moving in 
the required direction. It is also possible to show that 
excess capacity can exist in only one direction on a link. 
From condition 5 for both directions: 
= 0 
+ 0 = 0 
Adding these two equations yields: 
= > 0 
Therefore, if there is excess capacity from k to 1 then all 
cars must be fully loaded from 1 to k: 
n n ij 
ckl > L: L: akl qij => µkl = 0 => µlk > 0 
i~j 
n n ij 
=> elk = L: L: alk qij 
i~j 
If there were excess capacity in both directions on a link 
8 
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then it would be profitable to reduce the number of cars in 
both directions until all cars were loaded in one or both 
directions. Equation 8 indicates that cars can be fully 
utilized in both directions with each direction incurring a 
share of the total capacity charge. 
Since markets bear charges based on the existence of 
excess capacity, prices may not conform to value of service 
pricing or an inverse elasticity rule. Bailey and White have 
pointed out the converse in the peak-load pricing models: 
off-peak rates will exceed peak rates if peak demand is 
sufficiently elastic. 9 
The prof it-maximizing solution for any set of trans-
portation demands is characterized by the capacity conditions 
(constraint 2) since they determine the µkl and then the qij 
_:_ ___ :_ _____ .___ _ _._ ___ :_and-C:Kr:_-Tt. i-s-appa-re.nt:that--the-configur.ation .of.pec;Land. _ . __________ _ 
off-peak (or excess capacity) directions changes when demanos 
change enough. In particular, intermodal competition in some 
markets alters the demands faced by the monopolist and can 
cause peak directions to switch, thereby changing the 
capacity charges applied to both competitive and monopolistic 
markets. In the next section, a simple model is used to 
demonstrate that such competition can reduce beth output and 
welfare (as measured by surpluses). The effect of cost-based 
rate regulation is also explored. 
9Elizabeth Bailey and Lawrence White, "Reversals in Peak 
and Off-Peak Prices," Bell Journal of Economics and Management 
Science 5 (Spring 1974): 75-92. 
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2. Competition and regulation in a simple network 
Consider a railroad monopolist operating on the three-
node, two-link network depicted in figure 1. Assume constant 




s L: q .. , 
j~i 1.J 
= 
where dkl is the length of the link and dkl = dlk" The 
conservation constraints reduce to the requirement that 
c 12 = c 21 and c 23 = c 32 • Therefore, the problem facing 
the carrier is: 
maximize 1T = Rl2 + R21 + Rl3 + R31 + R23 + R32 
··- ·------ - ---------~-- --- ·-- - ---- - -------~-----····-
- s[ ql2 + q21 + ql3 + q31 + q23 + q32] 
- 2A[ c 12 dl2 + c23 d23] 
subject to: cl2 > ql2 + ql3 -
cl2 > q21 + q31 -
c23 > q23 + ql3 -
c23 > q32 + q31 -





. ·. ~-···'~-·· · ... ~· -·-· .·~---- ··-··· -~-·- -···---·-··· ,·. 
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Figure 1 
The first order conditions, assuming positive values for 













s + µ12 
s + µ12 + µ23 
s + µ23 
cl2 > ql2 + ql3' -
cl2 > q21 + q31' -
c23 > q23 + ql3' -
c23 > q32 + q31' -
= s + µ21 
= 
= 
s + µ21 + µ32 
s + µ32 
µ12[cl2 - (ql2 + ql3) J 
µ2l[cl2 - (q21 + q31) J 
µ23[c23 - (q23 + ql3) J 








=multiplier for capacity constraint from i to j; 
µ12 and µ21, for example, apply to constraints 
9 and 10, respectively 
Condition 15 includes the capacity constraints 9 through 12. 
15 
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Because there is only one route between any two points, 
this network can be termed a branch line network, in contrast 
to a main line system in which there are alternate routes 
between any origin and destination. A circular network, for 
example, would constitute a main line system. The general 
model described in section 1 applies to networks with both 
main and branch lines; the difference in model specification 
there is the explicit form of the conservation constraints. 
There is, however, no serious loss of generality in considering 
the simple branch line network because capacity charges in both 
models are determined by peak and off-peak (excess capacity) 
conditions on individual links, as demonstrated by a comparison 
of equations 8 and 14. 
For some demand functions and cost parameters the solution 
will be characterized by excess capacity from 2 to 1 and from 




s + 2Ad12 
s + 2Ad12 
s 
= 2Ad12 , = 0 
cl2 = ql2 + ql3 > q21 + q31 





s + 2Ad23 





This solution is illustrated in figure 2 for the markets 
requiring the use of the link between 2 and 3. 
Intermodal competition on the link between 2 and 3 
changes the demands faced by the railroad and can alter the 
peak directions and capacity charges associated with rail 
service. Motor carrier competition might be confined to the 
markets between 2 and 3 for two reasons. First, since rail-
roads have higher terminal and lower line-haul costs than 
trucks, the railroad might have a significant cost advantage on 
the long line between 1 and 2. Second, shippers between 1 and 
3 will not use rail-truck service if the cost of transferring 
freight from one mode to the other at 2 is prohibitive. 
If motor carrier service is supplied at a constant average 
cost r carload ( whatever t 
be established by the motor carriers), then demands for rail 
transportation in the competitive markets between 2 and 3 are 
given by D*D* in figure 2. At a rail price in either market 
equal to the cost of motor carrier service, more shippers will 
use trucks than railroads because of the greater speed and 
reliability of the former, thereby reducing the inventory cost 
of goods in transit. The two modes are not perfect substitutes, 
. however I beCaUSe Of differenCeS~iIJ. f3h.i..gp~r lOCatiOn cWi th 
respect to rail and truck terminals. That is, shippers located 
on rail lines will not switch to motor carrier service until 
the railroad rate exceeds the truck rate by more than the cost 
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rail transportation (at the intersection of DD and D*D* in 
the market from 2 to 3) all shippers prefer rail service. 
With new demands confronting the railroad in the 
competitive markets, the peaks and capacity charges must 
change: at the capacity charges given in condition 17, the 
related capacity condition for the link between 2 and 3 in 
condition 18 no longer holds. If q2 3 and q) 2 are the outputs 
under D*D* determined by the capacity charges in condition 17, 
then 
Assume that the capacity relationships on the link 
between 1 and 2 are not altered by competition on the other 
link. Then the solution to the railroad's profit-maximizing 
-----~-· -·"-·- ·-·---------·-··---·~----·---·-~~-·--~--~--~-~~~---·-----·------------·---~-------
problem under competition is giv_e_ri __ by_: ____ _ 
MRi2 = s + 2Ad12 
MRi3 = s + 2Ad12 + 2Ad23 
MR23 = s + 2Ad23 
ci2 = qi2 + qi3 > q21 + q31 
Cz3 = q23 + qi3 > q32 + q31 
MR21 = s 
MR31 = s 





The peak on the link between 2 and 3 has switched; excess 
capacity exists from 3 to 2. This solution is also shown in 
figure 2. For some other choices of D*D* the solution 
requires a joint peak, with capacity charges set so that the 
same number of carloads of freight moves in both directions 
on the link between 2 and 3. 
From a comparison of the first order conditions 16 and 19: 
22 
and for the rail demands D*D* shown in figure 2: 
23 
(It is possible for rail output to increase in the competitive 
markets. For example, q 23 increases if D*D* is sufficiently 
---- - ---- -- -----e-1 as t Ic--;--c:res-pTEe-EfiefiTgfie-r capacTt y cn-ar ge s----rn ct:frre-a-~-r-- -rn:----------- -- --- -
order for peak directions to switch, q 13 + q 23 must increase 
relative to q 31 + q 32 even though capacity charges rise in 
the former markets and fall in the latter. Since qi 3 < ql 3 
and q3 1 > q 31 , inelastic demands in the two markets between 1 
and 3 facilitate the switch. 
For the solution shown in figure 2, total rail output 
falls because, from conditions 18, 22, 23 and 21: 
In addition, rail (and total) profits decline because the firm 
could have chosen the competitive outputs before the entry of 
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the motor carriers with higher revenues in the competitive 
markets. 
The effect on welfare is more difficult to determine 
because the demand for motor carrier service in the competitive 
markets has not been specified. It is, however, possible to 
set a lower bound on the welfare gain. Motor carrier output in 
the competitive markets must be at least the horizontal 
difference between DD and D*D* at p*. This output, indicated 
by AB in the market from 2 to 3, would have been demanded from 
a railroad offering service at p* in the absence of intermodal 
competition. Some of those shippers who would have entered 
the market for the rail monopoly's service at rates less than 
p* may also opt for motor carriage at the trucking cost, but 
motor carriage more than rail service by at least the differ-
ence between truck cost and p*, the surplus associated with 
truck transport can be calculated as ir--the-r-esource J:::_Q§_t_ were 
------~-"--
p* and not the higher truck cost {another way in which the 
welfare gain is understated, since some of those shippers value 
motor over rail carriage by more than the premium paid for the 
former). The welfare consequences of competition in the 
markets between 2 and 3 are illustrated in figure 3. That 
diagram suggests a welfare gain, but it appears that mani-
pulation of the cost and demand conditions could produce an 
example in which total surplus declines. 
p 
Pi3 
P13 l ~ Market 13 
s+2Ad12A +2Ad23 
s+2Ad12 
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Minimum rate regulation in competitive markets can take 
several forms. The first is a rate floor based on the ICC's 
calculation of variable costs in each market. The costs 
recorded in the network are: 
3 3 





The ICC uses the corresponding system averages as its measures 
of variable costs: 
where 
s per carload 
2A(ci2ai2 + c2 3a2 3l ~-
3 3 
z:: z:: q .. a .. 
iij J.J J.J 
per carload-mile 
d .. = length of the route between i and j 
J.J 




> s + A' a .. 
J.J 
P .. = rate for transportation from i and j 
lJ 
A' = average line-haul cost in expression 25 
25 
26 
-· ---- ---· - . 
.,_., - ';;.,._.~.' ~··•'• w~ •••• ·-~··~·- ·~"" • ' 
82 
It is clear that: 
A < A' < 2A 27 
The first equality holds when cars are fully utilized in both 
directions on every link; that is, there are no empty cars in 
the system. It requires, for example, that: 
= = 
The second equality holds when loaded cars move in only one 
direction on any link. The required condition on the link 
between 1 and 2 could be: 
= = 0' = 0 
Figure 2 indicates that railroad rates in the competitive 
markets between 2 ana-:---:-3 satisfy the minimum rafe consErainEs as 
strict inequalities. In general, however, the constraint can 
only be effective in the market experiencing excess capacity. 
The constraint is always satisfied (as a strict inequality if 
rail demand is not perfectly elastic or A' ¥ 2A) in the peak 




lJ = s + 2Ad .. lJ > s + A'd .. lJ 28 
But the constraint can be effective in an off-peak market (in 
figure 2, the competitive market from 3 to 2) 10 because 
lO h. 1 l' . . k k . T is argument a so app ies to Joint pea mar ets, in 
which capacity charges are shared so that the same number of 
loaded cars moves in each direction. 
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marginal revenue is set at a level lower than the rate floor: 
P·. l.J 
> MR .. 
l.J 
= s < s + A'd .. 
l.J 
Therefore, in markets connected by a single link (primarily 
short-haul traffic), binding minimum rate regulation raises 
29 
price and reduces output in markets with excess capacity. It 
11 follows that such regulation cannot cause a reversal of peaks. 
However, when rate floors based on ICC cost figures are 
applied to markets requiring transit over more than one link 
(such as the markets between 1 and 3 in figure 1), peak condi-
tions can change. Since each of the markets in a city pair 
separated by more than one link normally 12 incurs capacity 
charges on some links and not others, neither can be designated 
a peak market. In that case, marginal revenue can be less than 
the rate floor, and the constraint can be effective in either 
or both markets. As a result, peaks can switch on any of the 
connecting links. 
The ICC has also restrained intermodal competition by 
requiring that rail rates be set no lower than motor carrier 
rates, with a differential sometimes approved to compensate for 
inferior rail service. The Commission has apparently enforced 
11 · h · · b d h · · 1 Since t e rate constraint is ase on istorica cost 
figures for regions served by several railroad systems, it is 
assumed that each firm considers the constraint exogenous. 
12It is possible that one of the two markets will incur 
all the capacity charges and the other market none, in which 
case the earlier single link argument applies. 
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rate parity in order to protect modal traffic shares. Such a 
constraint can be effective in any market and therefore can 
alter peak conditions and the assignment of capacity charges. 
This is also true for maximum rate regulation as well as rate 
floors based on various allocations of common costs. 
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3. Policy implications and research proposals 
The primary result of the simple network model is that, 
for some cost and demand parameters, intermodal competition 
and rate regulation can alter the peak conditions adopted by 
the profit-maximizing railroad. Rates in markets not subject 
to competition or regulation change with capacity charges, and 
the net effect on total surplus can be negative. 
This conclusion suggests that there will be no general 
shipper support for deregulation of entry and rates. To the 
extent that individual shippers can estimate the likely capacity 
charges under deregulation, they will support or oppose the 
change by location rather than commodity class. Moreover, 
piecemeal deregulation will be difficult to evaluate as a test 
respect to further change. (It is quite possible that the new 
constituencies will judge further deregulation incorrectly: 
winners are likely to support it and losers to oppose it, when, 
in fact, peak shifts can reverse their positions.) 
At least three other issues should be considered in 
the network model. First, economies of density in rail 
. . d. . d 1 1. k 13 service on in ivi ua in s appear to expand the set of 
demand functions for which competition and regulation can 
change peak conditions. Second, entry appears to play the 
13Robert Harris, "Economies of Density in the Rail 
Freight Industry," Bell Journal of Economics 8 (Autumn 1977): 
556-564. 
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same role here as in the sustainability models, which 
indicate that a multiproduct natural monopoly operating at 
zero profit will be able to set entry-deterring prices in all 
k 1 d . d. . 14 mar ets on y un er certain con itions. In both formula-
tions, an entrant supplying a subset of the markets can disrupt 
the monopolist's economies of joint production, here arising 
from the round-trip constraints. The resemblance ends there, 
however. Here, the monopolist is not constrained to earn 
zero profits, the monopolist's cost function is not continuous 
in the outputs, the entrant employs a technology not available 
to the railroad, and the railroad's response to entry is more 
realistic. 15 Finally, since railroad profitability is 
reduced by both competition and rate regulation, incentives for 
abandoning individual links are increased. 
14
John Panzar and Robert Willig, "Free Entry and the 
Sustainability of Natural Monopoly," Bell Journal of Economics 
8 (Spring 1977): 1-22. 
15Kenneth Baseman, "Open Entry and Cross-Subsidy in 
Regulated Markets," paper presented at the NBER Conference 
on the Economics of Public Regulation, December 15-17, 1977. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE INPUT EFFECTS OF COST SEPARATIONS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
Separations is the process by which common costs are 
allocated to different regulatory jurisdictions for rate-
making purposes in telecommunications. Separations, however, 
has received surprisingly little attention in the otherwise 
extensive economic literature on the behavior of the firm 
under regulatory constraint. Any effort to remedy that 
omission is particularly appropriate now because proposed 
revisions of the Communications Act contemplate significant 
ehanges in the-separations process. Tne purpose of-t:h_i_s 
paper then is to determine the effect of cost separations on 
input use by the firm. Profit-maximizing conditions for a 
two-product firm regulated in each market are compared to 
those for an unregulated firm and one operating under an 
overall constraint. Regulation is characterized by a con-
tinuously binding rate-of-return constraint or a pricing 
rule allowing the regulators to maintain the earned rate of 
return within certain bounds. 
The major element of common cost is the exchange plant 
used for connecting and switching calls within a city; it is 
required for the completion of long-distance calls as well 
as local calls. Exchange plant is provided by one of the 
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Bell operating companies (which are subsidiaries of AT&T) or 
independent operating companies. Intercity transmission and 
switching facilities generally are owned by the Long Lines 
division of AT&T. 
The separations procedures determine the assignment of 
an operating company's exchange plant to the state and federal 
jurisdictions. A particular type of equipment is usually 
divided on the basis of the relative outputs associated with 
it. After rate base and expenses are assigned to the two 
jurisdictions, revenue requirements and rates can be computed. 
The operating company is then entitled to recover from the 
pool of interstate revenues its expenses incurred in handling 
interstate calls and a rate of return on the portion of its 
separations rules are amended to allocate a larger share of 
exchange plant to the federal jurisdiction, the revenue 
required from state services (local service and state toll) 
to support the remaining expenses and plant is reduced. As 
a result, the separations procedures are an important factor 
in the relationship of interstate rates to local service and 
state toll charges. 
Three periods can be identified in the development of 
1 existing separations procedures. Through the 1930s, AT&T 
1This history review is based on Richard Gabel, Develop-
ment of Separations Principles in the Telephone Industrl (East 
Lansing: Michigan State University, 1967) and Gabel's recent 
draft revision. 
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advocated the assignment of all exchange facilities to the 
state jurisdictions. It apparently took this position because 
of prevailing regulatory practices. The states imposed rate-
of-return constraints but were concerned more with valuation 
issues than separations. Interstate rate regulation was not 
a factor because the ICC focused on surface transportation and 
because long-distance costs and rates were falling. Therefore, 
AT&T could assign as much of the common costs to the state 
jurisdictions as necessary to justify profit-maximizing local 
rates under the rate-of-return constraints. 
From 1936 to 1941, the FCC obtained five interstate rate 
reductions, and in 1943, AT&T amended the separations rules in 
order to shift rate base and expenses to the federal juris-
diction as a means of forestalling further reductions. Until 
the introduction of competition in terminal equipment and 
specialized intercity services in the late 1960s, AT&T period-
ically reclassified rate base and expenses to the interstate 
jurisdiction. 2 Those changes in the separations procedures 
were usually made with the uncritical approval of the Fcc3 
and the support of the state commissions. 
It is instructive to examine the policy of the state 
commissions _ more close 1 y: • The s ta t~-s-,ge.ne.r-al-ly-,-backe,d-tJ:Le. __ .-----
shift of rate base and expenses to the federal jurisdiction 
2The major separations changes are listed in the following 
table: 
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because it reduced the revenue requirement for state services, 
but they came to this position somewhat reluctantly. A ruling 
in 1930 in Smith v. Illinois Bell (282 U.S. 133) supported the 
assignment of some portion of exchange costs to the interstate 
jurisdiction, but the states failed to press for its implemen-
tation as a means of cutting state revenue requirements because 

















Estimated Increases in 
Interstate Revenue Requirement 









In 1974, 19 percent or $2.6 billion of local exchange costs 
were assigned to the interstate jurisdiction under prevailing 
separations rules: 29 percent of interstate MTS and WATS 
revenues were required to reimburse those costs. AT&T, "The 
Impact of Competition for Intercity Services and Terminal 
Equipment on Separations Assignments and Procedures," Bell 
Exhibit 45 in FCC Docket 20003, Appendix C. 
3aetween 1942 and 1966, the FCC did not formally address 
the separations issue or approve any of the principles being 
used. Its comments on the 1965 Denver Plan ar~ illustrative: 
" ••• this Commission will interpose no objections to incorpo-
ration of the revised procedures into the Separations Manual, 
and to their use, on an interim basis." The procedures 
adopted in a 1967 Commission ord~r on separations were codified 
into the FCC rules so that subsequent changes have required a 
rule-making proceeding. Gabel~ draft Chapter VI, pp. 3, 17. 
4At FCC hearings on separations in 1942, the counsel for 
NARUC (now the National Association of Regulatory Utility 
Commissioners) opposed the assignment of exchange plant to the 
interstate jurisdiction because it would "offer opportunity 
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eventually agreed to the separations changes in order to reduce 
the difference in rates for state and interstate toll calls. 
Technological change and economies of density had affected 
long-haul costs more than short-haul costs. The rate disparity 
arose because long-haul rates subsidized short-haul rates in 
the interstate rate structure while state toll rates enjoyed 
no such subsidy and so suffered by comparison with interstate 
rates for calls covering the same distance. Moreover, with no 
breakdown of state costs by toll and local service, state 
regulators usually met increased revenue requirements by 
raising toll rates. Therefore, the states found in the rising 
(because of increasing demand and productivity) federal rate of 
return the opportunity to prevent interstate rate reductions 
. that aggravated the rate disparity as well as to alleviate 
pressure on local and state toll rates. Nevertheless, the 
separations changes seldom brought about lower rates: between 
1942 and 1965, only 22 percent of the decrease in state 
revenue requirements associated with separations amendments 
were translated into rate reductions, and most of the cuts 
5 were in toll charges. 
In the late 1960s, the FCC authorized competition in the 
for an extension of federal jurisdiction to the field of 
exchange operations." Another NARUC representative, however, 
reported that the adoption of the principle in the 1930 
decision would reduce state revenue requirements by $50 
million! Gabel, p. 39. 
5 Gabel, pp. 128-129. 
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provision of private line service. Private line is long-
distance service over a designated set of points available to 
the user on demand for a flat monthly charge; the firms 
supplying the service (besides AT&T) are known as specialized 
common carriers. AT&T has since resisted the steady transfer 
of rate base and expenses to the interstate jurisdiction. 6 
Since private line services did not until recently bear any 
common costs under the separations procedures, shifts to the 
federal jurisdiction would have raised the revenue require-
ments and rates for public long-distance service and thereby 
increased the attractiveness of private line vis-a-vis the 
public services. The states have reacted to AT&T's refusal 
to reclassify rate base and expenses by opposing competition 
in private line service. They contend that competition by 
the specialized common carriers reduces the interstate 
revenue pool to be divided and, since diversion to private 
line reduces public toll usage of local exchange facilities, 
cuts the share of exchange plant assigned to the interstate 
rate base. 
In addition, the states have joined AT&T in opposing 
competition in the supply of terminal equJ-pment.----The.y~ar-gue ___ _ 
that when a user obtains a terminal device from an outside 
6There has been no major revision in the separations 
procedures since 1971, and AT&T has opposed shifts to the 
interstate jurisdiction under the so-called California plan. 
Gabel, draft Chapter VI, pp. 48-49. 
. -· .. 
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vendor instead of the local operating company the company's 
revenues from equipment rentals and separations fall more than 
its costs, so that the revenue requirement for basic exchange 
service increases. Indeed, AT&T has defended its earlier 
reclassification of rate base and expenses and its current 
anticompetitive stance by pointing to its "mandate" to provide 
universal service at reasonable rates and arguing that the 
subsidy provided to residential customers by the separations 
process must be improved or at least maintained. But recent 
studies by several state commissions have revealed that the 
Bell companies have used the revenue obtained by allocating 
a share of terminal equipment to the interstate rate base to 
finance rental rates that do not cover the marginal costs of 
residential service is not subsidized by terminal equipment 
revenues. 
More recently, AT&T has reacted to the authorization of 
extensive private line networks by imposing charges for access 
to its local distribution facilities that include a share of 
common costs. Access charges for all intercity carriers, 
in6luding AT&T, are being considered in pending leglislation 
as a means of providing any desired subsidy. Most parties, 
in £act, have come to view separations more as a political 
7
studies by the New York, Vermont, and Massachusetts 
commissions are cited in, Federal Communications Commission, 
First Report in Docket 20003 (1977). 
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process than as a technical costing procedure. In the past, 
AT&T made its case for separations changes in terms of better 
measures of relative use or simpler procedures, but its more 
recent statements have focused explicitly on the subsidy of 
exchange rates. In addition, the FCC is taking a more active 
role in the development of the separations rules and has 
stated that the procedures can be modified to off set any 
adverse effect of competition on local service rates. 
The available evidence indicates that the share of common 
costs now assigned to interstate services exceeds the welfare-
maximizing share. Optimal pricing requires that the common 
costs be recovered by markups over incremental costs that are 
inversely related to the price elasticities of demand. But 
Littlechild8 has found that the excess of price over marginal 
cost is greater on the longer routes, which exhibit the higher 
elasticities of demand. 9 Consequently, it appears that the 
8s.C. Littlechild, "Peak-Load Pricing of Telephone Calls," 
Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 1 (Autumn 
1970): 205-206. 
9
Long Lines has estimated daytime elasticities for busi-
ness and residential services, respectively, to be -0.2 and 
-0.3 for 500-700 mile routes and -0.1 and -0.2 for 100 mile 
routes. Nighttime figures are approximately double. The 
estimated elasticities for local service are not significantly 
different from zero, and -0.l is commonly used. Littlechild, 
p. 207. In a more recent study, Littlechild and Rousseau 
surveyed the available demand studies and concluded that the 
best estimates for elasticities of overall demand with respect 
to constant percentage price changes in all periods of the 
day are -0.99 for interstate calls, -0.43 for intrastate 
calls, and -0.4 for local calls. s.c. Littlechild and J.J. 
Rousseau, "Pricing Policy of a U.S. Telephone Company," 
Journal of Public Economics 4 (1975): 41-42. 
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increases in interstate revenue requirements induced by changes 
in the separations procedures have been exorbitant and that 
interstate rates exceed efficient levels. 10 
Despite the importance of separations as a regulatory in-
strument, few attempts have been made to analyze the effects 
f h · 1 f · d · · 11 o t e separations ru es on irm ecisions. Braeutigam has 
demonstrated that a horizontally integrated firm can earn 
higher prof its than its unintegrated counterparts, each of 
which is separately regulated, if it can control the allocation 
of common costs. 12 In addition, Hannon has used a simple model 
to show that the changes in the separations procedures advo-
cated by AT&T were prof it-maximizing responses to differences 
in allowed rates of return and changes in market competition. 13 
l-OHowever., . r~d oe s ... no E. fc:n-i-ow-e-h-a-:es~t-crte-:-t~o-1-1-an·d-ro·q:a-1-~-~~ 
exchange service are necessarily underpriced. Since the demand 
for interstate service is more elastic than the demand for 
state services, a shift to efficient pricing (which would 
initially lower interstate rates and raise state rates) would 
increase the use of common facilities. State rates could fall 
below original levels because increased volume would reduce the 
markups required to break even and marginal costs would fall if 
there are economies in the use of common equipment. 
11Firms operating in more than one jurisdiction have been 
studied in other settings. For example, MacAvoy and Noll have 
examined the behavior of natural gas pipelines with both regu-
lated and unregulated sales. Paul MacAvoy and Roger Noll, 
"Relative Prices on Regulated Transactions of the Natural Gas 
Pipelines," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 
4 (Spring 1973): 212-234. 
12 Ronald Braeutigam, "A Comment on ITT v. GTE," paper pre-
sented at the Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, 
Airlie House, Virginia, April 1974. 
13 James Hannon, "The Impact of Cost Allocation in a Multi-
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But the effects of separations on input use by the firm have 
been ignored, a surprising omission in view of the attention 
(in)efficient production has received in most studies of 
operation under an overall rate-of-return constraint. 
This paper addresses the question of input use for a 
profit-maximizing, two-product firm regulated in both markets. 
The decision variables for the firm are specific and common 
capital and labor. A specific input can be used to produce 
only one output and is assigned to the corresponding juris-
diction, while a common input can be used to supply both 
outputs and is apportioned to the two jurisdictions according 
to the separations rules. Long-distance transmission facili-
ties, for example, are specific to the provision of interstate 
service. However, inputs specific to the supply of state 
services are harder to identify. Virtually all facilities 
required for the supply of local and state toll service are 
also used to provide interstate service. The telephone, for 
example, is used for both local and long-distance calls. 
Therefore, the firm is assumed to produce both outputs with 
common inputs and inputs specific to the interstate juris-
diction only. 
Market Monopoly: Telecommunications" (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Illinois, 1978). Hannon's conclusions, however, 
are based on the assumption that capital and labor cannot be 
adjusted in response to a change in the shares of common cost 
assigned to each jurisdiction. If input levels are allowed 
to vary, then the effect of separations changes on profits 
depends on the demand and production functions. 
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In addition, the firm can employ unproductive inputs; the 
regulatory commissions are assumed to be unable to distinguish 
between wasteful and productive inputs in the rate-making 
process. 
The shares of common costs assigned to each jurisdiction 
are set by the regulatory authorities in some formulations of 
the problem and by the firm in others. The effect of the 
separations process on input decisions can be determined by 
comparing the profit-maximizing conditions for a firm regu-
lated in both markets to those for an unregulated firm and 
one operating under an overall constraint. 
Two models of the regulatory process are considered. The 
first is a variation of the Averch-Johnson model, in which the 
firm is subject to a continuously binding rate-of-return 
constraint in each jurisdiction. The allowed rate-of-return 
in the federal jurisdiction is assumed to be higher that its 
14 state counterpart. But the Averch-Johnson characterization 
of the regulatory process is unrealistic because it allows the 
14 If the Averch-Johnson model of rate regulation is accu-
rate, then observed rates of return should mirror allowed 
rates of return. Reynolds found that from 1954 to 1970 (the 
last year for which he listed figures) the five-year moving 
average rates of return for Long Lines exceeded those for the 
combined Bell companies. However, the number of states with 
a return (not averaged) greater than Long Lines' increased 
dramatically in 1970 and remained high through 1972. Robert 
Reynolds, "Bell," Department of Justice memorandum, February 28, 
1974. Hannon also reported that interstate returns were higher 
than overall state returns in the 1960s. Hannon p. 182. 
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firm to set prices. It is instead the regulatory commissions 
that set prices, and the firm is required to satisfy the 
resulting demands for service. 
Joskow has argued that regulators establish procedures 
that minimize conflict among competing interest groups while 
. . 15 1 . . meeting statutory requirements. As a resu t, commissions 
generally do not initiate rate reviews but instead react to 
requests for rate changes. When a carrier files for a rate 
increase, the allowed rate of return used to evaluate the 
request is likely to be close to the cost of capital because 
user groups will oppose anything more than a "fair" rate of 
return and because the average return of other firms will be 
considered an upper bound. However, earned rates of return 
not be 
discovered and protested by consumers if rates are not rising. 
Even if the observed return is high enough to provoke com-
plaints from users and review by the commissions, the allowed 
rate of return will probably exceed the cost of capital 
because the average industry return will be considered a 
lower bound in order not to penalize the firm for efficient 
15Paul Joskow, "Inflation and Environmental Concern: 
Structural Change in the Process of Public Utility Price 
Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics 17 (October 1974): 
291-328. For a discussion of this theory of agency behavior 
in the context of the FCC's regulation of television broad-
casting, see Roger Noll, Merton Peck, and John McGowan, 
Economic Aspects of Television Regulation (Washington: The 




Therefore, in the second model of the regulatory process, 
the commissions adjust prices to maintain earned rates of 
return in a range defined by the cost of capital and some 
higher allowed rate of return. The firm chooses inputs 
(specific and common, productive and wasteful) to satisfy 
demands at prevailing prices and to influence future prices. 17 
This price-adjustment model appears to be consistent 
with state and federal regulation of telephone rates. The 
state commissions could have reduced rates after shifts of 
rate base and expenses to the interstate jurisdiction and 
faced renewed pressure for increases (because of rising 
exchange costs) shortly thereafter. But they chose instead 
to hold rates fixed and allow the carriers a higher realized 
-
return in order to postpone the rate increases. In addition, 
the few cuts that were made affected state toll rates and 
served to reduce the embarrassing rate disparity between 
state and interstate calls of the same distance. 
16Joskow has found evidence in state regulation of elec-
tric utilities to support various hypotheses about commission 
activity and observed rates of return that are consistent 
with this description of the rate-making process. Joskow, 
pp. 299-311. 
1 7 . . 1 t . f th k . . A simi ar representa ion o e rate-ma ing process is 
used in, Stuart Burness, David Montgomery, and James Quirk, 
"The Turnkey Era in Nuclear Power: A Case Study in Risk Sharing 
Arrangements Involving Regulated Firms," Social Science Working 
Paper No. 175, California Institute of Technology, September 
1977. 
ioo 
Until the 1970s, however, the FCC frequently expressed 
concern that the rate of return earned by AT&T on interstate 
traffic was too high, but it allowed AT&T to choose between 
rate cuts and separations changes as a means of solving the 
problem. This emphasis on the rate of return is somewhat 
puzzling because there was little support for such a policy 
outside the Commission. The states favored increases in the 
interstate share of common costs, but rate reductions only 
aggravated the rate disparity problem. Moreover, it appears 
that AT&T did not support all the rate cuts and adopted some 
separations changes only to prevent them. 
One explanation for the FCC's behavior is that with 
growing demand and technical change in long-distance communi-
cations AT&T repeatedly attained rates of return large enough 
to trigger review by the Commission. That AT&T was allowed 
to earn a return exceeding the cost of capital is suggested 
by the higher interstate rate of return. 18 Furthermore, the 
increases in the number of states with rates of return higher 
than the federal jurisdiction that occurred after 1970 coin-
cided with the first interstate rate increases in twenty 
years. 19 This fact indicates that the FCC as well as the 
18see note 14. However, the relative rates of return are 
also consistent with regulatory lag and an allowed rate of 
return always equal to the cost of capital. 
19rnterstate rate and separations changes for the twenty 
years ending in 1975 are listed in the following table: 
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state commissions are now concerned with the lower bound on 
allowed rates of return and are raising prices to provide a 
return equal to the cost of capital. 
The remainder of this paper is divided into three parts. 
The first two examine the effects of the separations process 
on input use in the Averch-Johnson and price-adjustment models 
of regulation. The third considers the policy implications 






























"-" indicates no change. AT&T, p. 9. 
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1. An Averch-Johnson approach 
In these models, the firm is subject to a rate-of-return 
constraint in each jurisdiction, but the regulators do not 
explicitly set rates. 
Consider first the case where the shares of common labor 
and capital assigned to each jurisdiction are determined by 
the regulatory authorities. Then the problem for the firm 
can be stated in the following way, where jurisdictions 1 and 
2 are taken to be the federal and state jurisdictions, respec-
tively: 
maximize 
* * L1 1 L,L1,L2 




K,L = capital and labor inputs common to the provision 
of service in both jurisdictions; K includes 
local distribution facilities and L the labor 
to maintain them 
K1,L1 = inputs specific to the provision of interstate 
service; K1 includes interstate transmission 
lines and L1 the required maintenance 
* * * * K1,K2,L1,L2 = unproductive inputs employed in jurisdictions 
1 and 2 
1T = prof its 
w = wage rate 
-- ··- "" - -···-~ .. --------------------·--------~---------- ------~~----·---~-··-·-·--· ..... -----·········.. . ........ . 
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r = cost of capital 
Rl =revenue in jurisdiction l; Rl = pl(ql)ql, 
where p1 and ql are price and output and 
q1 = f 1 (L1,K1,L,K) or R1 = R1 (L1,K1,L,K); 
f+ > O, where f+ is the marginal product of 
1 1 
input i; Rl is strictly concave in the inputs 
R2 = revenue in jurisdiction 2; R2 = p2 (q2) q2, 
where q2 = f2 (L, K) or R2 = R2 (L, K) ; f? 1 
> 0 
and R2 is strictly concave in the inputs 
= allowed rates of return in jurisdictions 1 and 
2; s 1 > r and s 2 > r 
a, f3 = shares of common capital and labor assigned by 
the regulators to jurisdiction 1 
The first order conditions for a maximum, assuming 
productive inputs, are given by: 




-w) (l-A1) = 0 4 
1 2 
L: RL(l-A1) + RL(l-A2) - w 
5 
= 0 6 
1 2 
K: RK(l-A1) + RK(l-A2) - r 










* L2 > O· -w ( l-A2) < 0 9a,b - , -
* 9c L2 (-w) (l-A2) = 0 
* Kl .::: 0; AlSl - r < 0 lOa,b -
* K1 <A1s1-r) = 0 lOc 
* K2 .::: 0; A2 8 2 - r < 0 lla,b -
K2(A2s2-r) = 0 llc 
Al _::: 0 12a,b 
* * - Rl) A1 (s 1 CK1 + aK + K1J + w[Ll + BL + L1J = 0 
A2 .:'.: 0 13a,b 
constraint multipliers in jurisdictions 1 and 2 
marginal revenue product of input i in juris-
diction j 
Conditions lOb, llb, 12a and 13a bound the constraint 
multipliers: 
r 
0 < Al < < 1 14a,b 
From equations 8c and 9c, it follows that labor inputs are 
never wasted: 
= = 0 
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* It is also possible to show that Kl = o. By equation 4, 
1 ~1·f:E1 = that Rij1 O; that is, the firm operates RL1 = w, so > 
in the elastic portion of the demand curve in jurisdiction 1. 
1 * Consequently, RKl > 0. But if K1 > o, then A.1 s1 = r from 
condition lOc and 
1 
0 from equation 6, contradiction. RKl = a 
* Therefore, K1 = o. Without a capital input specific to the 
provision of state services, however, no such argument can be 
* used to rule out K2 > 0. The use of unproductive capital in 
the state jurisdiction will be illustrated and discussed below. 
* Even if K2 = O, so that the firm operates on the pro-
auction frontier, it does not supply the two outputs at mini-
mum cost. If A.1 > 0 the usual Averch-Johnson distortion in 




occurs. From equation 6: 
i--A.r··· 
Combining this result with equation 4 yields: 
< r 
w 
A cost-minimizing firm would equate the ratio of the marginal 
products of specific capital and labor to the ratio of the 
input prices ~, but the rate-of-return constraint creates a 
w 
bias toward the use of K1 • 
Equation 7 can be rewritten in the following way: 
R~ + R~ - r = 7a 
-- ------------------ - -------------- - ---- -------------~-----~- ---------------------------------
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Both expressions in brackets are non-positive: the concavity 
of the revenue function guarantees that the slope (in K) of 
the prof it hill does not exceed that of the constraint plane 
at their profit-maximizing intersection. Profits in juris-
diction 1 are R1 - w(L1 + SL) - r(K1 + aK), and allowed 
profits are (s1-r) (K1 + aK). The profit hill and constraint 
plane are shown in figure 1 for given values of Li, Ki, and L. 
At point A, the slope of the profit function is R~ - ar, and 
the slope of the constraint is ( s 1-r) a. Therefore: 
RKl < - ar 
Similarly: 
R2 - (1-a)r < K 
or RKl < as1 
or 
It is not possible for both conditions to be satisfied as 
15 
16 
equalities. Equality holds in either case if the profit hill 




1 - w(L1+SL) 
- r(K1+aK) 
Figure 2 
.. ' ----------- ---;------- -------;---------------
2 R - w(l-S)L 
- r(l-a)K 
and this can occur only at a point on the left side of the 
profit hill at a value of K less than that which maximizes 
profits in that jurisdiction. If the constraint plane were 
tangent to the profit hill in each jurisdiction, as shown in 
figure 2, neither constraint would be binding, and the firm 
could adopt the unconstrained prof it-maximizing solution. 
If either constraint is binding, then the corresponding 
condition 15 or 16 is satisfied as a strict inequality, and 
condition 7a becomes: 
< 0 
If the firm were unregulated or subject to an overall 
rate-of-return constraint, it would use capital inputs so that 
RR + R~ = Here, however, it is not possible to make such 
a general statement about the relative use of K and K1 by 
comparing the first order conditions 6 and 7. If it is the 
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case that and * K2 > 0, then from equation 
llc, and A1s1 ~ A2s2 and Al < A2 from conditions 14a and 
14b. Then: 
and: 
Combining these conditions with equation 6 yields: 
< < 
If a is sufficiently small, then the ratio of marginal revenue 
"- " . . ..... 
products is less than one, indicating that common cap:ital ls 
overutilized. In other cases, the relative use of K and K1 
depends on the parameters of the demand and production func-
tions. However, it will be shown below that common capital 
is underutilized when the shares assigned to each jurisdiction 
are decision variables for the firm. 
The condition on common labor is also difficult to inter-




If the terms in brackets in equation 4a are not both zero and 
A1 ~ A2, then by equation 4b they must be of opposite sign so 
1 2 
that RL + RL - w is not equal to zero and impossible to sign 
from the first order conditions. The equilibrium condition 
for common labor can be examined with the aid of figures 3a 
and 3b, which illustrate the intersection of the profit hill 
and constraint plane in each jurisdiction (the equilibrium 
conditions for specific labor and capital are assumed to be 
satisfied in jurisdiction 1). Without requiring at first that 
K and L be the same in both jurisdictions, it follows from the 
concavity of the revenue functions and the slopes of the con-
straint planes that the expressions in brackets in equation 4a 
are both zero at the profit maximum in each jurisdiction. If 
either were not (as, for example, at point A in figure 3a, 
········ ··1 
where RL - Sw > 0), then it would be possible to move up the 
All points on profit 
hill; B and C above 




profit hill by increasing or decreasing labor as the corre-
sponding term in equation 4a is positive or negative (to point 
B in figure 3a). The constraint would then be violated, but 
it could be satisfied by increasing capital, resulting in a 
higher final profit (at point C in figure 3a). In effect, the 
firm could move along the intersection of the prof it function 
and constraint plane to a higher prof it if the expression in 
equation 4a were not zero. If the profit-maximizing inter-
sections in jurisdictions 1 and 2 occur at the same values of 
L and K, then R£ + RE - w = O for that solution. If the 
values of L do not coincide, then the firm adjusts them by 
moving along the intersection of the prof it hill and constraint 
in each jurisdiction until they are identical (at point A in 
figure 3a and point E in figure 3b). This adjustment, which 
also reduces K, is preferred to sliding down the profft hill 
for fixed K because the latter strategy sacrifices more profit 
because of the concavity of the profit hills (compare points 
A and D in figure 3a). The equilibrium at which the values of 
L are the same is characterized by equation 4b, so the sign 
of 
1 2 
RL + R1 - w in equation 4a depends on the revenue 
functions. 
If the firm were unregulated or subject to an overall 
rate-of-return constraint, it would employ labor so that 
R£ + Rt = w. When common labor costs are allocated to the 
two jurisdictions by the regulatory authorities, however, 
R£ + Rt ~ w, and the usual input distortion between capital 
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and labor in the Averch-Johnson models can be increased or 
decreased. 20 
Figures 4a and 4b illustrate a case in which * K2 > 0, 
that is, waste occurs in jurisdiction 2. The profit hills 
and constraint planes are drawn in n-K space on the assumption 
that the productive inputs L1 , K1 , and L take on their solution 
values. K is the level of common capital that maximizes 
a 
profits in jurisdiction 1, but in jurisdiction 2 the firm 
earns excess prof its BC at 
the excess profits by hiring 
K = K • 
a 
The firm can eliminate 
units of the unproductive 
input K;, which enables the firm to retain 
The firm should increase its use of common capital beyond 
K as long as profits increase. In jurisdiction 2 an increase 
a 
in K produces at the margin an increase in allowed prof its 
(which equal AB when K = Ka) of (s2-r) (1-a) and a decrease 
s 2-r 
of [R~ - r(l-a) - (s 2-r) (l-a)J[52J in the excess profits 
retained by the firm. In jurisdiction 1 the firm loses profits 
of R~ - ar as common capital is increased. In addition, as 
K increases beyond K the constraint in jurisdiction 1 ceases a 
to be active, and Al = 0. Summing the prof it changes indi-
20 h d d d. . h t . . . 1 . T e secon or e~ con it1ons t at cer a1n pr1nc1pa minors 
of the 7x7 (assuming K~ > 0) bordered Hessian matrix alternate 
in sign are not very useful in resolving the ambiguities in 
relative factor use. Any conclusion obtained from the second 
order conditions would probably depend on the second partial 
derivatives of the revenue functions. Comparative statics 
results are also difficult to obtain because of the inter-





w(l-S)L - r((l-a)K + K2) 
cates that the firm should increase K until: 
- ar = 0 17 
By the concavity assumptions, the left-hand side of equation 
17 is decreasing in K. Condition 17, however, is identical to 
equation 7, the first order condition on common capital, when 
r 
Al = 0 and A2 = S-' which holds when K2 > 0. If the profit-
2 
maximizing value of K is Ka' where Al > O, then equation 7 
can be rewritten as: 
- ar = < 0 
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(The inequality follows from condition 15.) That is, if the 
optimal value of K is Ka' then profits must fall as K is 
increased beyond K • 
a 
In the standard Averch-Johnson formulation, the firm 
operates in the elastic portion of the demand curve and prefers 
to employ an additional productive input instead of an unpro-
ductive one because the former adds to revenue as well as the 
allowed profit. In the separations model, however, the firm 
wastes inputs because it has no specific input to employ in 
jurisdiction 2 and because it must consider both jurisdictions 
when it manipulates common input$. 
Next consider the case where the firm itself determines 
the shares of common capital and labor assigned to each juris-
Then the first-order conditions 4 thr 
supplemented by (assuming an interior solution): 
w.r.t. a: 18 
s : 19 
If s1 ~ s2, then it is not possible for both 0 < a < 1 and 
0 < S < l; that is, the firm should assign all common capital 
or labor to one jurisdiction. For example, if s1 > s2 and 
0 < a < 1, then A1w - A2w < 0 and S = 0. If both rate-of-
return constraints were satisfied as equalities and S were not 
zero, then the firm could increase allowed profits by reas-
signing labor to jurisdiction 2 and capital to jurisdiction 1. 
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If S were reduced by shifting labor costs owL to jurisdic-
tion 2, then allowed profits would be less than and greater 
than earned prof its by owL in jurisdiction 1 and 2, respec-
tively. Increasing a by shifting capital owL to jurisdiction 
1 would restore the constraint in jurisdiction 2 to equality; 
but in jurisdiction 1 allowed profits would exceed reported 
sl 
profits because ~owL > owL, thereby enabling the firm to 
s2 
increase revenues and total profits. In general, the firm 
maximizes profits by assigning common capital to the juris-
diction with the higher allowed rate of return and common 
labor to the other until a or S is zero or one. 
However, it is unlikely that AT&T has ever had the freedom 
to set a and S independently. The company has long argued that 
outputs, and it has been both flexible and creative in defining 
the relevant outputs. Therefore, a more realistic assumption 
is that the firm determines the allocation of common costs 
subject to a = s. Then the additional first order condition 
is (assuming 0 < a < 1): 
w.r.t. _ a(=S): 20 
It is possible to show that now If * K2 > O, then 
A2s2 = r from equation llc. As a result: 
r 
Al = = 
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which contradicts condition lOb that Therefore, 
with the ability to manipulate the allocation of common costs, 
the firm finds it unnecessary to employ unproductive capital 
in jurisdiction 2. 
The Averch-Johnson model, however, is unsatisfactory for 
at least two reasons. First, the profit-maximizing conditions 
require that the firm operate in the elastic portion of the 
demand curve in at least jurisdiction 1, but, as described in 
the introduction, the empirical evidence is that demands for 
both interstate and local service are inelastic. Second, the 
Averch-Johnson characterization of the regulatory process is 
unrealistic because it allows the firm to set prices. In the 
next section, therefore, a model is developed in which the 
regulatory commissions set prices and the firm employs inputs 
"-
to provide the required services and influence future prices. 
Again, the problem is to determine the effect of the separa-
tions process on input decisions by the firm. 
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2. A price-adjustment model 
Here the commission in each jurisdiction adjusts prices 
at the beginning of each period to account for the firm's 
profitability in the previous period. The firm chooses labor 
and capital in each period subject to the common carrier con-
straint that it provide the service required by the prescribed 
prices. 
The price in any period is determined by the price and 
firm input choices of the previous period, according to the 
regulators' pricing rules. That is: 
21 
22 
Superscripts denote time, and subscripts indicate jurisdiction; 
for example, p~ is the price in period i in jurisdiction j. 
The inputs available to the firm are those considered in the 
Averch-Johnson formulation in section 1. Since the pricing 
rules hold for all but the initial period (period 1), p~ can 
be written as a function of pt and all inputs assign~d to 
jurisdiction j up through period i-1. 
The problem for the firm is: 
maximize 
Li Li L *i L *i ' 1 1 1 ' 2 
Ki Ki K*i K*i ' 1 1 1 ' 2 
i=l, .. ,T 
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TI = E [R
1 




2 w(Li + Li + Lii + Lzi) 
+ Ki + Kii + K2i) J 
i i i i i i i 
0 i 1, .. , T f ( L , L1, K , K 1; q1,q2) > = 
where T = number of periods 
R1 =revenue in period i in jurisdiction j; 
or 
i i i 
R· = R·(p·) J J J 
fi = production function in period i; fi is 
increasing in the productive.inputs and 
decreasing in the outputs; f
1 
is concave 
in its arguments 





Then the first order conditions for a maximum, assuming posi-
tive values for the productive inputs, are: 
w.r.t. = 0 25 
= 0 26 





*i K. > 0; 
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- r < 0 
= 0 
T 3p. 
L: [Am _:_]__] · < 0 
J. *i - w m=i+l 
- w) = 0 









These conditions demonstrate that the firm considers the value 
of the productive inputs in satisfying the supply constraint 
at existing prices (in the marginal product terms for period i 
in equations 25 through 28) and the effect of all inputs, even 
unproductive ones, on prices and required outputs in future 
periods (in the bracketed terms for periods i+l to T) . 
In order to explore the question of factor use, it is 
helpful to assume that the capital or labor inputs assigned 
to a jurisdiction affect future prices in the same way. That 
is, if a is the share of common capital assigned to juris-

















Analogous conditions on the labor inputs are assumed (8 is the 
fraction of common labor assigned to jurisdiction 1). If the 
firm were instead subject to overall regulation (individual 
prices adjusted to account for total firm profitability, for 
example), then common inputs would not be separated and 
distinguished from specific ones: 
m m m m ap. ap. ap. ap. 
_",J_ = _J = _ J_ = _J _ j = 1,2 34 
()Ki * •. *' aK1 ()K 1 aK 1 1 1 2 
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Again, a similar relationship exists among the labor inputs. 
If the firm were unregulated or unable to influence 
future prices, it would produce the required outputs effi-
ciently and employ no wasteful inputs. This can be seen in 
the fact that the first order conditions for period T reduce 
to the usual efficiency conditions. From equation 29c, for 
example, *' K. 1 > O would require r = 0. 
J 
Consider now the possibility of unproductive input use 
under divided regulatory authority. If it is profitable to 
waste~capital or labor in jurisdiction 1, then the corre-
spending condition 29b or 30b must be satisfied as an equality, 
so that Ai = 0 from equation 27 or 28 for specific capital 
or labor. (The importance of assumptions 32 and 33 for this 
argument is obvious.) Therefore, if inputs are wasted in 
urisd.icfio:ril., if must be true that the product.ion constraint 
is satisfied, in which case any input could be employed for 
the purpose of altering prices in future periods. (This is 
also true for overall pricing regulation.) If it is possible 
that unproductive inputs will be detected and disallowed, 
then the firm will probably employ productive ones for this 
purpose. 
However, the supply constraint can be binding even if 
*' *' 
inputs are wasted in jurisdiction 2 : K l l positive 2 or L2 
requires the corresponding expression 29b or 30b to be zero, 
but that does not require Ai = 0 in the common input 
equation 25 or 26. The constraint is binding here because 
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the firm recognizes the effect of all the productive inputs 
in the pricing rule for jurisdiction 1 and would use less of 
them in the absence of the production constraint. However, 
the firm does not have the option of substituting a produc-
tive input assigned to jurisdiction 2. Furthermore, adjusting 
common inputs in order to influence future prices in juris-
diction 2 is not practical because prices in jurisdiction 1 
are also affected. Therefore, the firm will in some cases 
waste inputs in jurisdiction 2 even if there is a possibility 
of detection. Notice that the argument turns on the lack of 
a specific input in jurisdiction 2, just as the existence of 
waste in the Averch-Johnson model did. 
The separations process directly affects the relative 
use of common and specific inputs when there is no waste. 







r - X:[Am -. -.] 
l oK1 2 oK1 - 35 
a m 
a Ki - l:: Am 
oP1 
r 1 a Ki 1 1 
Since specific and common capital assigned to jurisdiction 1 
have the same effect on future prices, it is the allocation of 
some common capital to jurisdiction 2 that makes the ratios in 
equation 35 greater or less than one, depending on the marginal 
revenues associated with assigning a unit of capital to one 
jurisdiction or the other. The shares chosen by the regulators 
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determine the extent of the bias but cannot affect its direc-
tion. 
The shares of common capital and labor assigned to each 
jurisdiction also affect the relative use of those inputs. 
From equations 25 and 26, the marginal products stand in the 
same relation as the corresponding factor prices if: 
()pm m Clp2 
l:[Am--!. + Am -.] 
1 ()Kl 2 ()Kl r = -a m m w 
l:[Am p~ Am Clp2 + -.] 
1 ClLl 2 ()Ll 
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The left side of equation 36 depends on both the pricing rules 
for a unit of capital or labor assigned to either jurisdiction 
and the shares a and S. A similar expression for the specific 
inputs can be obtained by comparing equations 27 and 28, but 
without a. separations problem, oril:Y the pricing rules affect 
relative factor use. 
The effect of different pricing rules and assignments of 
common inputs is not very profound: the firm deviates from 
efficient factor proportions if inputs differ in their impacts 
m on future revenues (through the A. and the pricing rules). It 
J 
is useful, however, to examine input use in the context of the 
specific pricing rule described in the introductory section of 
this chapter. 
That pricing rule can be described in the following way. 
The regulator raises price if a deficit was incurred in the 
previous period to a level that would have allowed the firm to 
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break even: 
i+l i i 




i aKi)] = i 
+ + r(Kl + 37 
ql 
i+l i 1 [w(l-B)Li i Ri] P2 = P2 + + r(l-a)K i 2 
q2 
1 [w(l-B)Li i = i + r ( 1-a) K ] 38 
q2 
The existing price is maintained if the firm earned non-negative 
profits at a rate less than the allowed rate of return. If 
the firm earned more than the allowed rate of return, then the 
~--~-------,.--'. J::'~<:f:t1J.:<:t·t::.c:>.:t:'Y• .. :c:i--1.:1.-t:h0r-i-t.y·-. reEl.uees-f)r-.i-ee-te-a-1.-eveJ.-tha-t-woul.d-ha.v:e---~­
y ielded that return. In that case, the pricing rules woufd 
be those given in equations 37 and 38 with r replaced by s 1 
and s 2 . These rules assume that the firm operates in the in-
elastic portion of the demand curve in each jurisdiction. 
Since the pricing rules are not continuous, the maximum 
must be determined by comparing profits for each sequence of 
increasing, maintaining, or decreasing prices over the firm's 
horizon. For any such application of the pricing rules, the 
first order conditions 25 through 28 characterize the profit-
maximizing solution. 
The effect of the asymmetric treatment of labor and 
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capital on input use can be seen by comparing conditions 27 
and 28 on the specific inputs. When the firm acts to raise 




in efficient proportions; but when the firm expects to trigger 
a rate reduction, it overutilizes K1 because > r. The 
bias arises because K1 is more cost-effective in minimizing 
the anticipated rate cut. 
While the relationship between the common inputs (which 
is expressed by the left side of equation 36) is similarly 
affected by operations that precipitate a rate reduction, the 
allocation of costs can also cause inefficient factor use. 
That is, even if the firm's profitability will not exceed the 
allowed rate of return, equation 36 will not be satisfied if 
a ~ a because <lemand coriditions are not 
the same in each jur.isd.ict.ion. (C>l:>viously, the effects of 
s. > r and a~ S can be offsetting.) The same effects 
1 
determine relative factor use for common and specific capital 
in equation 35. 
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3. Conclusion 
The separations process affects the proportions in which 
the firm combines productive inputs in both the Averch-Johnson 
and price-adjustment formulations of the problem; moreover, 
it introduces the possibility that unproductive inputs will 
be employed in the Averch-Johnson model. 
Overall regulation eliminates the. biases caused by cost 
separations if prices are marked up or down to account for 
the firm's total profitability. However, regulation of a 
multi-product firm by a single·authority more often results 
in the cost allocation task being performed internally so 
that rates can be tied to costs. In the Averch-Johnson model, 
allowing the firm to set the shares of common capital and 
.. ·.:l,""Ctbor----:-a-i:;~i;-±:g_rr_~~Cl .. •.1::9----:-e-a:cti~j·ur±s·d-±ct±on--reinove~s~the~incent±ve--j:o 
employ wasteful inputs; but the other effects of this policy 
have not been explored, and the Averch-Johnson model is not 
a very realistic characterization of regulation on which to 
base policy prescriptions. Since the use of unproductive 
inputs in the price-adjustment model does not depend on the 
separations proces$, making the cost assignments a decision 
variable for the firm would not have the effect predicted by 
the Averch-Johnson model. The effect of such a policy change 
on productive input use remains to be determined. 
There are, of course, other modifications and issues that 
should be studied. Specific inputs in jurisdiction 2, some 
126 
probability of detecting wasteful inputs, and an explicit 
investment and depreciation mechanism should be introduced. 
Furthermore, the effect of the separations process on the 




American Telephone and Telegraph Company. "The Impact of 
Competition for Intercity Services and Terminal Equip-
ment on Separations Assignments and Procedures." Bell 
Exhibit 45 in FCC Docket 20003 (1975). 
Bailey, Elizabeth, and White, Lawrence. "Reversals in Peak 
and Off-Peak Prices." Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science 5 (Spring 1974): 75-92. 
Baseman, Kenneth. "Open Entry and Cross-Subsidy in Regulated 
Markets." Paper presented at the-NBER Conference on 
the Economics of Public Regulation, Washington, D.C., 
December 15-17, 1977. 
Boyer, Kenneth. "Minimum Rate Regulation, Modal Split Sensi-
tivities, and the Railroad Problem." Journal of Political 
Economy 85 (June 1977): 493-512. 
"The Price Sensitivity of Shippers' Mode of Trans-
:QJ t:: .•.. E>J:;.,-:L-::<::=cti-::c,-n_,.-c.nrd-.,-th:~ _:E-11i::~-rinodal~A-l-J:-oca-t-ion~o-f-F-r-e-ig-h-t-----~ 
Traffic." Ph.D. dissertation, (JI1lversity of Michigan, 
1975. 
Braeutigam, Ronald. "A Comment on ITT v. GTE." Paper presented 
at the Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, 
Airlie House, Virginia, April 1974. 
"Optimal Pricing with Intermodal Competition." 
American Economic Review 69 (March 1979): 38-49. 
Burness, Stuart; Montgomery, David; 
Turnkey Era in Nuclear Power: 
Sharing Arrangements Involving 
Science Working Paper No. 175, 
Technology, September 1977. 
and Quirk, James. "The 
A Case Study in Risk 
Regulated Firms." Social 
California Institute of 
Charnes, A.; Cooper, W.W.; Kirby, M.J.L.; and Raike, W.M. 
"Regulatory Models for Pricing and Evaluation of Trans-
port Service." Transportation Science 6 (February 1972): 
15-31. 
128 
Charnes, A.; Kirby, M.J.L.; Littlechild, S.C.; and Raike, W.M. 
"Chance Constrained Models for Transport Pricing and 
Scheduling under Competition." Transportation Science 2 
(February 1968): 57-76. 
Federal Communications Commission. First Report in Docket 
20003 (1977). 
Florian, Michael, and Nguyen, Sang. "A Method for Computing 
Network Equilibrium with Elastic Demands." Transportation 
Science 8 (November 1974): 321-332. 
Friedlaender, Ann. The Dilemma of Freight Transport Regulation. 
Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1969. 
Gabel, Richard. Development of Separations Principles in the 
Telephone Industry. East Lansing: Michigan State Univer-
sity, 1967. 
Griliches, Zvi. "Railroad Cost Analysis." Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science 3 (Spring 1972): 26-41. 
Hannon, James. "The Impact of Cost Allocation in a Multi-
market Monopoly: Telecommunications." Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Illinois, 1978. 
Harbeson, Robert. "Toward Better Resource Allocation in Trans-







"Economies of Density in the Rail Freight 
Bell Journal of Economics 8 (Autumn 1977): 
The Transportation Act of 1958: A Decade of 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969. 
Interstate Commerce Commission. 78th Annual Report. Washington: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964. 
9lst Annual Report. Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1977. 
Interstate Commerce Commission, Bureau of Accounts. Cost ~f 
TransEorting Freight by Class I and Class II Motor Common 
Carriers of General Commodities by Regions or Territories 
for the Year 1964. Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1965. 
129 
Cost of Transporting Freight by Class I and Class II 
Motor Common Carriers of General Commodities by Regions 
or Territories for the Year 1970. Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1972. 
Distribution of the Rail Revenue Contribution by 
Commodity Groups, 1961. Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1964. 
Explanation of Rail Cost Finding Procedures and 
Principles Relating to the Use of Costs. Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1963. 
Freight Commodity Statistics, Class I Motor Carriers 
of Property Operating in Intercity Service--Common and 
Contract in the United States, 1972. Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1973. 
Freight Commodity Statistics, Class I Railroads in 
the United States for 1964. Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1967. 
Rail Carload Cost Scales, 1975. Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1978. 
Rail Carload Cost Scales by Territories for the Year 
1970. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973. 
---· ·--- - -----···------- - - . - --- - -- -
Rail Carload Unit Costs by Territories for the Year 
1964. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966. 
Simplified Procedures for Determining Cost of 
Handling Freight by Motor Carriers. Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1968. 
Transport Statistics in the United States, Year 
ending December 31, 1970, Part 1, Railroads, and Part 7, 
---~--='-.,...-~--...-~~~-----,.-...-~ 
Motor Carriers. Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1973. 
Interstate Commerce Commission, Bureau of Economics. Carload 
Waybill Statistics, 1964: Mileage Block Distribution. 
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967. 
Interstate Commerce Commission, Bureau of Transport Economics 
and Statistics. Frei~ht Revenue and Wholesale Value at 
Destination of Commodities Transported by Class I Line-
haul Railroads. Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1961. 
]30 
Joskow, Paul. "Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural 
Change in the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation." 
Journal of Law and Economics 17 (October 1974): 291-328. 
Keeler, Theodore. "On the Economic Impact of Railroad Freight 
Regulation." Department of Economics Working Paper No. 
SL-7601, University of California - Berkeley, September 7, 
1976. 
Kolko, Gabriel. Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1916. New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1965. 
Levin, Richard. "Allocation in Surface Freight Transportation: 
Does Rate Regulation Matter?" Bell Journal of Economics 
9 (Spring 1978): 18-45. 
Littlechild, s.c. "Peak-Load Pricing of Telephone Calls." Bell 
Journal of Economics and Management Science 1 (Autumn~~ 
1970): 191-210. 
-----, and Rousseau, J.J. "Pricing Policy of a U.S. Tele-phone Company." Journal of Public Economics 4 (1975): 
35-56. 
MacAvoy, Paul. The Economic Effects of Regulation: The Trunk 
Line Railroad Cartels and the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission before 1900. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute 
~--~-------0-f-'Feeh-n0±0gy-P-r-e-s-s-, -l-9-6-5·~.------~--------------~ 
-----, and Noll, Roger. "Relative Prices on Regulated Trans-actions of the Natural Gas Pipelines." Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science 4 (Spring 1973): 212-234. 
_____ , and Sloss, James. Regulation of Transport Innovation: 
The ICC and Unit Coal Trains to the East Coast. New York: 
Random House, 1967. 
McKie, James. "Regulation and the Free Market: The Problem of 
Boundaries." Bell Journal of Economics and Management 
Science 1 (Spring 1970): 6-26. 
Meyer, John; Peck, Merton; Stenason, John; and Zwick, Charles. 
The Economics of Competition in the Transportation 
Industries. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959. 
Moore, Thomas. "Deregulating Surface Freight Transportation." 
In Promoting Competition in Regulated Markets, pp. 55-98. 
Edited by Almarin Phillips. Washington: The Brookings 
Institution, 1975. 
131 
Nelson, James. "The Motor Carrier Act of 1935." Journal of 
Political Economy 44 (August 1936): 464-504. 
Noll, Roger; Peck, Merton; and McGowan, John. Economic Aspects 
of Television Regulation. Washington: The Brookings 
Institution, 1973. 
Panzar, John, and Willig, Robert. 
ability of Natural Monopoly." 
8 (Spring 1977): 1-22. 
"Free Entry and the Sustain-
Bell Journal of Economics 
Reynolds, Robert. "Bell." Department of Justice memorandum, 
February 28, 1974. 
Scherer, F.M. 
formance. 
Industrial Market Structure and Economic Per-
Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1970. 
Sparling, Lee. "Rate Regulation and Freight Traffic Allocation: 
A Review and Revision." Social Science Working Paper 
No. 68, California Institute of Technology, March 1975. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Interstate Trucking of Fresh 
and Frozen Poultry under Agricultural Exemption. Marketing 
Research Report No. 224. Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1958. 
Interstate Trucking of Frozen Fruits and Vegetables 
---~~------=::::::=:::=;:;u::;n~-a-e·r~Agr±-cu-1-tu-r-a-l~E-xempt-ion-.----M-a-r-k-e-t-i-ng~Re-s-e-a-r-ch~Re-f)0-r-t:~---~ 
No. 316. Washington: u. s. Government :Printing Off ice, 
1959. 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 1963 Census 
of Manufactures, Vol. III, Industry Statistics, Parts 1 
and 2, Commodity Groups. Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1966. 
1972 Census of Transportation, Vol. III, Commodity 
Transportation Survey, Part 3, Area Statistics, South and 
West Regions and U.S. Summary. Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1976. 
1967 Census of Transportation, Vol. III, Commodity 
Transportation Survey, Part 1, Shipper Groups. Washington: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970. 
1963 Census of Transportation, Vol. III, Commodity 
Transportation Survey, Part 2, Commodity Groups. 
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966. 
--------------~------
132 
U.S. Department of Transportation. Alternative Scenarios for 
Federal Transportation Policy: Second Year Final Report 
under Contract DOT-RSPA-DPB-50-78-32. 2 vols. Washington: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978. 
Williams, Ernest. The Regulation of Rail-Motor Rate Compe-
tition. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958. 
